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Swedish and Estonian Discourses on Free EU Movement, Welfare and Belonging

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Swedish and Estonian discourses on free EU movement, welfare and belonging

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1. INTRODUCTION

As a part of an investigation on welfare access and the portability of social rights among Estonians moving between Estonia and Sweden this paper analyses Estonian and Swedish policy expert's interview narrations on free EU movement, welfare and portability regulations. The aim is to identify conditions that might have an impact on the portability practices of Estonians migrating to Sweden, namely the discourses of belonging inherent in the interpretations of Estonian respectively Swedish welfare regulations and debates.

Discourses of belonging express views on what society and its economy should look like and on migrant's roles in this, on how welfare benefits should be used and whom should be entitled to them. They express gendered, ethnicized/nationalized, age- and class-related etc. views on national membership and belonging and hence views on who belongs where, when and on which conditions. Discourses of belonging are built by various intersecting logics, logics that may support or challenge each other (Fröhlig et al. 2016a). Discourses of belonging, and the logics that underpin them, in turn create criteria of inclusion and exclusion. These criteria have an impact on the distribution of social security rights and the possibilities to port your social rights. Discourses of belonging and their criteria of inclusion and exclusion thus might create conditions for migrants – for their management of their welfare and their ability to access and port welfare benefits.

In this paper we identify and compare the discourses of belonging of Estonia and Sweden. We do this by uncovering the various logics within the discourses with the aim to understand how these underpin or challenge each other and produce various criteria of inclusion and exclusion.

Estonian migration to Sweden

People have been moving to Sweden from Estonia in larger scales since the 1940ies, when Estonians fled World War II and the incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet Union. In 1945 about 75 000 – 80 000 Estonians had escaped to West Europe and among these one third, 25

000 – 28 000 individuals, moved to Sweden (see e.g. Kumer– Haukanõmm 2011, Tammaru et al 2010, Tammaru et al 2017).

Further migration took place 1991 when Estonia declared independency from the Soviet Union.¹ Next large inflow came after the acceptance of Estonia as a member in the EU in 2004, where Sweden was the fourth most preferred country of destination for Estonians (Veideman 2010, Reiter 2013).² The 2008 global economic crisis reinforced mobility within EU and from Estonia this mobility was to a large extent directed at Nordic countries (Aidukate 2013).

The number of people that have emigrated from Estonia in whole is estimated to 4,5% of the population – including mobile, commuting people (Hazans and Philipps 2011) and Estonia has until the very last year's been facing problems with labour force shortage due to declining population. Due to these problems authorities are now trying to promote remigration, but also some immigration of highly skilled workforce from other European countries (Tammaru 2015, Lauristin 2015, see discussion below).

As a result of the Swedish-Estonian migration history and general changes in migration conditions, there are at present different types of Estonians in Sweden. Firstly, there are those who fled World war two as well as those who fled during communist rule – and descendants of these people. Secondly, there are the Estonians migrants of the free EU mobility, among which we can find new types of movers – such as for example circular migrants and posted workers.³

Today roughly around 10 000 Estonians are statistically registered as residing in Sweden – most of them living in Stockholm and Gothenburg (Lundborg 2013). To this number we can, according to the Nordic Council, however add an approximation of 15 000 Estonian-born people who work in Sweden, but who are not residing in the country long term and thus are

¹ <http://www.immi.se/encyklopedi/tiki-index.php?page=Ester>

² The more preferred destination are Finland, the UK and Norway.

³ Circular migrants and posted workers are often over-lapping categories. Another type of transnational migrant is the many Estonian Swedes who travel from Sweden to spend time family properties in Estonia (the old family properties or new ones).

not registered in the statistics – such as for instance (commuters and circular migrants etc.) If we include these more mobile categories, the Estonians in Sweden can hence be estimated to around 25,000 persons.

As Estonians registered as residing in Sweden is only the eleventh biggest foreign-born group in Sweden they are statistically a relatively small immigrant category. But as mentioned, the category expands with around 60% if counting people who work in Sweden but are not statistically registered as residents. Compared to Estonians in other EU states the more mobile 60% in the Nordic countries are less educated and to a higher percent blue-collar worker (Krusell 2009).

Estonians in Sweden is a non- problematized migrant category in Sweden. They are in everyday discourse seldom spoken about as “immigrants” in a derogatory sense, as for example migrants from Middle East and Africa might be. To this we can add official discourses, both in Estonia and Sweden, which promotes Estonia as a Nordic country. The high percentage of commuters within the category and the normalizing, non-othering discourses surrounding Estonians in Sweden make them an interesting category to investigate – in contrast to the common tendency within migration studies to examine the othered groups.

Material

The analysis in this paper is based on interviews with 15 Estonian and Swedish welfare policy experts – with seven Estonian experts and eight Swedish ones. By policy experts we mean employees on different levels within welfare related institutions, who have good knowledge of the system – either a general overview knowledge or a specific area knowledge. The aim of the interviews was to find out how the policy experts interpreted the welfare regulations and in general related to the Estonian respectively Swedish welfare system and to the supra national EU regulations and to the portability of social benefits within the EU.

The seven interviewed Estonia policy experts were working in different institutions such as SOLVIT, EURES, the Estonian Social Ministry, Employers Union and Justice Department. All the experts were female, which mirrors the gender composition of the employees at the

institutions in question. Five of the experts held EU level positions and therefore were participants in various ongoing discussions on EU level.

The eight interviewed Swedish experts in turn were working at SOLVIT, the Swedish Government Chancellery, Tax Board Agency, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Social Insurance Administration and Public Employment Service. All interviewees but one was female. As the experts were working either with regulations (interviews 2, 3, 4) or with the implementation of the regulations (interview 1, 5 and 6) they can all be seen as part of the discourse on “free movement of workers within the EU”.

Three of the Estonian interviews were performed via Skype while the remaining three were non-mediated, face-to-face conversations. In the Swedish case one of the interviews was made via Skype, while the rest were non-mediated, face-to-face conversations. All interviewees had the right to be anonymous.

The setting of the interviews varied. In the Estonian case the three interviews conducted via Skype were all made from the interviewees office, while among the three non-mediated face-to-face interviews one was a group interview conducted at the office of one of the experts and two were conducted at coffee shops. In the Swedish case, the experts in the Skype interview used a media-room at their place of work. The five non-mediated face-to-face interviews were performed at the office of the expert (interview 1), at a meeting room in the experts’ place of work (interview 2, 3, 4) and in a coffee shop (interview 6).

The interviews were of qualitative, in-depth character. The same interview guideline was used for all interviews, where the experts were asked to elaborate on various predefined themes related to welfare and EU-migration (Fröhlig et al. 2016a). These overall interview themes were handed over to the interviewees in written form before or in the beginning of the interview, while the more specific questions were asked during the interview if needed – to encourage the interviewee to expand on the themes. The interviews were all tape recorded and then transformed into text by using a transcription guideline (Fröhlig et al. 2016a).

The interviews all started with a short introduction on the goals of the project and by presenting the interviewee with a consent letter to be approved and signed. The interviewer thereafter reaffirmed that the interviewees could withdraw from the interview if wanted. After this more formal and administrative introduction the narrative part of the interview was opened, generally by asking the interviewee to position her/himself in relation to the welfare state organisation and in relation to EU migration. The interviews then largely followed a specific structure, starting with questions on the history of Estonian respectively Swedish welfare systems, continuing with more specific questions on the nature of immigration and emigration and the country-specific problems related to EU migration. The structure of the interview however varied due to the topics which the interviewees chose to pick up.

The content of the interviews also came to vary significantly, among other things depending on the position of the expert. There were interviews that very much focused on the specifics of the area the interviewee had experience with, while others were more general. The dynamics of the interview – and hence the content – was furthermore affected by the way the different interviewees acted out their expert position. Some were keener than others on ‘teaching’ the interviewer the system from a top-down perspective. In instances where the expert was young in relation to the interviewer, this probably triggered the interviewees to underline their knowledge and thereby their expert position.

Due to different national backgrounds of the interviewees, the dynamics in the interviews also came out somewhat differently in the two country cases. In the Estonian case the interviewer shared Estonian background with the experts, which created a communal ‘insider’ feeling as well as a common discursive space. This resulted in the experts often assuming the interviewer to share common knowledge on the Estonian example. In the Swedish case, the interviewer did not share the Swedish background of the experts, and this can be one of many ways to understand why these experts, to a larger extent than the Estonian ones, proved to be very keen on praising the Swedish social security system and explaining its complex regulations to the interviewer.

Analysis

The material created in the interview interaction and during the transformation of the spoken language into written language, can, in both country cases, be viewed as parts of a chains of texts. This, as the EU-regulations and the national laws throughout the interviews are by the experts “translated” into an ordinary, spoken mundane language and this material in turn functions as a device for the researchers to access the language and discourses of social security. In this paper, we, in turn have transformed the experts “translation” of EU-regulations and national laws into the language of academic analysis and scientific text.

To be able to discover the main discourses embedded in the interviews we have been attentive to the *different voices/texts* which were included/excluded in the interviews. Different voices are brought up by for instance experts from EU commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and EU law court. Openness to these differences has helped us to discover different level of decisions as well as various ways of interpreting the law texts.

We also directed our analytic attention towards *assumptions* – existential, propositional or value assumptions as they reduce differences by assuming common grounds. Furthermore, we have been searching for *intertextuality*, which opens up difference by bringing in other voices in the text (Fairclough 2003: 41). The character of the interviewees’ statements has also been of interest that is whether the statements were *statements of fact (realis), of predictions, hypothetical statements or evaluations*.

With the purpose of examining the classifications made by the interviewees, we examined which semantic relations (addition, elaboration, contrast) that became relevant and addressed *relations of equivalence and of difference* in the transcripts. When were the classifications made by *creating differences* between objects, entities, groups of people? When were they made by *collapsing differences* – by representing objects, entities, and groups of people as equivalent to each other (Fairclough 2003: 88)

The above concepts from Fairclough’s critical Discourse Analysis (2003) helped us to identify the different *logics (political, social and fantasmatic)* that create the Estonian respectively

Swedish discourses of belonging (Glynos and Howarth 2007 and 2009). They hence helped us to answer questions on which *criteria of inclusion and exclusion* that are expressed in the discourses and thus to answer questions on who belongs where, when – on which conditions and with which consequences? (Fröhlig et al. 2016b)

2. THE ESTONIAN WELFARE SYSTEM AND ITS DISCOURSE OF BELONGING

After the Soviet communist era welfare system – with strong universalistic and collectivistic features (Cook 2007: 38) – Estonia in the 1990ies enthusiastically embraced neoliberal prescriptions with low controls of capital, rapid liberalization of trade and foreign investment, reduced provisions of social welfare and reduced labour rights. The Estonian system hence moved towards individualism and is today often labelled as a neoliberal model, due to macroeconomic indicators of low welfare state spending, high income inequality, low minimum wage and the low degree of recommodification (Bohle 2007, Lendvai 2009). However, one notable exception is child benefits where Estonia is spending the highest percentage of GTP in Europe. The Estonian social security system of today can be characterized as centralised, with a universal health service, low state funded contributory pension and low-level means-tested social support. According to Eurostat (2015), per capita spending on social security in Estonia is among the lowest in the EU, and the levels of many benefits are low.

This section focuses on Estonian welfare and migration-experts who all, some more than others, were involved in topics of EU mobility. It examines their narrations on EU free movement, welfare and portability with the aim to identify the logics behind the narrations and to thereby detect the Estonian discourse of belonging and its criteria of inclusion and inclusion.

In the interviews with the Estonian experts the specific Estonian welfare benefit regulations were seldom commented on. Instead the experts focused on wider topics – such as where

Estonia as state should belong in relation to the EU, how other EU states perceived of Estonia and Estonian EU-movers. They also, to some extent, focused on immigration to Estonia. One could say that Estonian experts' discourses on EU free movement, welfare and portability consist of both an (dominating) outwards directed part concerning the belonging of Estonia and of Estonian EU emigrants *and* of an inwards directed part concerning who should belong to Estonia. The chapter is structured accordingly, starting out with the outwards directed part of the discourse concerning the belonging of Estonia and of Estonian EU emigrants.

The belonging of Estonia and its emigrating population

Despite its geo-political location in Eastern Europe, Estonia was often described as Westernized in the expert narratives. Such descriptions are in line with Estonian politics, where there has been an attempt to market Estonia as a Western country – starting from having Estonia perform in Eurovision event for Nordic countries and ending with having Estonia in Nordic council. The descriptions are also in line with the active lobbying among western countries, – such as UK and the Nordic countries including Sweden, to establish a discourse in which Estonia is regarded as one of “us”. As we will see there was in the narrations of the experts a lot of assumptions regarding East Europe, West Europe and on their relationship. These assumptions we below analyse as governed by a logic of East and west.

A logic of East and west – exclusion related to ethnicity and class

Even though there was an attempt by the experts to position Estonia as a Western country, at another and more overarching level several also framed Estonia as a part of Eastern Europe. Many times, the experts distinguished between the interests of the Western states vs. the Eastern states. Such a rhetoric – built on assumptions about the existence of a dichotomy and hierarchy between East and West Europe – was especially pronounced when talking about Estonian migration inside EU, which is about the outward migration of Estonian EU citizens and their belonging.

“Our work force is going away. We are schooling work force and it is going away and then we are not even getting family benefits. We have to educate these children, schools and everything has to be provided by us and we are not getting the taxes from this given person. On the one hand, yes these are our children so why should someone else pay, but then again the mother of a child is not working and the father is getting his salary in the other state,

but we have contributed so that he could earn there. I think that UK's economy has won a lot from having all the Polish people there."

The quote above is from an interview with an expert who works with welfare on national level, but who also has participated in welfare work on EU level. It displays reactions to the issue concerning the change in handing out family benefits. The context is that EU is considering changing the way family benefits are currently given, meaning that the *families* of mobile workers would get the benefits from the state where he/she is working, *even* if the mobile worker is not living with the family. The current political debate in EU seems to be heading in the direction where the benefits would now be indexed, meaning the sum would be set to the level of the home country. To use an example: Polish males working in UK have been able to send home to their families' social benefits that were on UK level. According to the potential new rule they instead would receive benefits indexed to Polish level.

The expert is making a distinction between East and West. In this case Estonia is clearly positioned as belonging to the Eastern states. An unequal power relation is also visible in the quote above, as the expert is describing Eastern European states as relatively helpless because of migrating workforce, brain drain and as being in the midst of an ongoing discussion on the matters of social benefits.

Experts also brought out the problem of offering services for the aging population, a problem which they mean is skilfully avoided by Western states and their companies by employing cheap labour from East on a temporary basis.

"Countries with higher life quality and salaries feed from cheap workforce. Even though we do not know how it will end. Will these people come back to their home country when they retire and then the country of origin has to offer services for them, even though they have not received the benefits of their productive years?"

The expert from the Social Ministry above is clearly worried about socio-economic consequences that the return of aging migrants might have on the country of origin. She hence refers to the Western states as benefactors that 'use' Eastern Europeans when they are still productive, but might not have to take social responsibility for providing to these people at

their old age. This is especially relevant in the cases of temporary workforce. The argument of the expert seems to be that the unequal position of East and West is enhanced by the employment of cheap labour force from Eastern Europe and by leaving Eastern European states to deal with this labour force when they are in their non-productive years. These sorts of arguments were built on existential assumptions of Western States as being in power, of having other interests than the Eastern States.

In general, most Estonian experts found that Western states are regarding work force from Eastern Europe as only temporarily residing in the receiving country and hence not needing to be integrated to the society. One expert, who had a direct contact with Estonian EU movers and their problems abroad, especially referred to various cases where Estonian workers were not granted social benefits which they had rightfully earned. One of the cases is explained as follows:

“Just yesterday we accepted a complaint from a woman who has lived nine years in Finland and only has a grownup son in Estonia. She visits Estonia twice/thrice a year and Finnish social services suggested her to apply for unemployment benefits in Estonia. The interesting part was that the union who administered her case demanded her some additional documents but made a negative decision before they had received the documents.”

According to the expert, but also visible from documentation, such cases are common in Finland. The expert pointed out that it is extremely difficult for Estonian workers to get for example unemployment benefits in Finland, especially if they still have a family residing in Estonia. This was the case even for workers that had lived several years in Finland. The above-mentioned expert furthermore described how the common response to Estonians migrants who applied for benefits in Finland was to suggest them to return to their ‘home country’. Whether the woman in the case above, who had been working in Finland for nine years, wanted to stay in Finland or not was not even in question. Rather from the way her case was handled it seemed that her return to Estonia was preferred. Such recurring examples send message to the Estonian migrants – messages that they are only welcome to West as long as they do not become a burden to the social system of the receiving country. Their belonging to West is thus conditioned.

As shown above, Western states are often depicted as a homogenous category. In case any specific country is singled out it is seldom Sweden, but, as we have seen, above all Finland and also the UK. Both Finland and UK were mentioned in critical ways by focusing on the strategies these countries used in order to avoid or abuse migrant workforce. Finland is the main destination for Estonian mobile EU citizens and is thus the country with which Estonia has the most experience. Finland also seems to have a special and somewhat ambivalent position in the expert narrations. It was on the one hand depicted as too close to be considered 'West', but on the other hand alien enough to not be 'East'. The positioning of Finland as 'not so Western' was especially related to the strategies, both legal and illegal, that the experts meant were used by Finnish employers and social institutions. One interpretation is that the positioning of Finland as not so western is connected to the implicit assumption that 'real Western countries' would not employ such strategies. The silence around Sweden could accordingly be interpreted as the country being positioned as a real Western country. There were some comments on Sweden though. One of the few explicit one was made by an expert from SOLVIT who expressed the opinion that Sweden usually hands out benefits to EU citizens without problems, but is stricter with third world citizens.

The case of Sweden can hence be interpreted as sign of the experts perceiving few particular problems with the portability of social benefits among Estonian citizens moving between Estonia and Sweden. But there were however also problems related to Sweden described by the Estonian experts. One problem brought to the fore was the hinder of getting into the Swedish system. The SOLVIT expert for example mentioned that Swedish SOLVIT is not helping migrants with issues related to PIN – and thus getting to the system – since they can do very little about it.

Another expert criticised the Swedish labour regulations and the rule that individuals has to have one-year contract before one can apply for identification number. She also criticised that Estonian companies, when entering to the state, are forced to make strong cooperation with Swedish companies. Other problems mentioned in relation to Sweden were the Swedish labour market regulations and the Swedish unions, which both were seen as actively limiting Eastern EU workers access to the labour market.

“Sweden wrote an ugly article against Estonian companies and it was totally fabricated because in the end the tax office checked the company and the company won. However, the journalists have started a topic that it is social dumping and cheap labour force, even though the company pays well for its employees. But indeed, social insurance payments for us and in Sweden are different.”

The Social Ministry expert cited above is for example in dialogue with the public discourse in Sweden which is condemning posted work. Her view on the related incident is that the Swedish media reacted with the allegations on social dumping, even though the Estonian company was following the law.

These various restrictions on entering the state and the labour market were seen as sending clear-cut signals to both individual workers and companies that Sweden is a stronghold, defending keenly its labour market against foreign access. However, parallel to this was a view that once one has managed to enter the state and get inside Sweden, one is seen as belonging and can rely on social protection.

Not only Sweden was seen as fighting against cheap labour from Eastern European states, but also other countries. In general, Western countries were in fact presented as counteracting free movement. The experts mentioned various strategies instituted by Western countries in order to limit free movement. These included for example minimum salaries, limiting legislations, union movements.

“Germany and Belgium have already set a minimum salary for truck drivers. Norway is now also setting minimum wage. It is highly competitive and the sole purpose is: ‘do not come to my backyard’. All the talk about humanism and how one should not sleep in the car ‘oh so terrible’, that is just a cover....”

The quoted expert from the Employers Union is making fun of the rules instituted by some Western countries, which are, according to their official rhetoric’s, in place to protect Eastern European workers. Later in the interview she also ironically refers to social dumping as a “nice concept” hiding the real and more selfish policies of the Western states. This is one example of how the Estonian experts view Western debates on the need to protect mobile workers,

namely as in place only to limit the access of cheap Eastern European labour to Western labour markets.

Western European states are hence seen as fighting against Eastern European workers – one way or another. On the one hand countries such as Finland are seen as taking advantage of cheap workforce and then refusing to contribute to social welfare of these workers. On the other hand, countries such as Sweden are seen as trying to avoid the access of Eastern European workforce all together – and therefore are seen as being against free movement. Both strategies are however seen as sending the message ‘you do not belong here’. In the case of Finland, it is seen as sent by treating workers as temporary and taking very little social responsibility for them. In the case of Sweden this message is seen as sent by having strong requirements for accessing the country social system. Finland is hence pictured as a country where it is easy to come in, but where you are easily thrown out as well, while Sweden is pictured as a country of ‘mythical opportunities’ – once one manages to enter the system. In both cases the Estonians who migrate seems to be viewed by the experts as belonging to these receiving countries. But as we have seen they are also viewed as denied this rightful belonging.

As shown the logic of East vs. West builds on a strong dichotomisation both regarding economy and social status – where West is put to one side and Estonia to the other and Eastern side. The dominance of this logic can be seen as based on experiences of being shut out from the thing desired – as due to economy/class but also in the sense of ethnicity not being allowed to belong to the West. But as we will see later on the logic East vs. West not only mirrors a narration of one’s own exclusion from West, it also reproduces the East –West dichotomisation.

A logic of development – fighting exclusion related to ethnicity and class

Despite the described dominating logic of East vs. West and the positioning of Estonia as East the country– as mentioned – was often described as Westernized and as unfairly positioned in the group of Eastern European countries. The experts branded Estonia as Westernized in its belonging inside EU and this branding was to a large extent done by describing Estonia as highly developed. This could for example be done by depicting the countries social benefits as somewhat more innovative compared to Western countries benefit systems.

“I have understood that many countries do not have such a parental leave system as we do. Many Western countries expect you to return to work very quickly. In Finland for instance one can stay at home only for one and a half months.”

This above expert from the Social Ministry depicts Estonia as being well ahead of many Western countries when it comes to some aspects of family benefits. The Estonian parental leave for example gives parents the possibility to stay at home with one's child for one and a half years. This is described as giving women a chance to have both family and career. The problem of having to return to work quickly is obviously seen as an issue for women as they have to choose between either staying home longer and therefore risking their career or 'being a bad mother'. The size of the Estonian parental benefit is directly related to the salary of the parent and was described as motivating highly skilled and highly paid women to give birth more. It was depicted as more 'fair' because people will not have to give up on their income due to child rearing. Estonia has never had the central-European logic with stay at home mothers of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and Austria etc. Rather it has been common to both work and raise children, however, this is here advertised as a sign of innovation and forward thinking.

It was not only the parental leave part of Estonian welfare system that was depicted as innovative. Even the Estonian welfare system as such could be described in such a mode. The Estonian welfare system was depicted as a patchwork, where the country's administration has used other systems as prototypes for different part of the own system and then mashed them together. Even though this patchwork design was described as done out of pure necessity during the reinstatement of the state in 1990ies, it was sometimes also branded as innovative. There was for example pride expressed in having 'chosen the parts of other nations welfare systems that fit with the Estonian national ideology – such as the Swedish model for parental benefits.

Furthermore, it was accentuated that Estonia has also included elements in their welfare system that many other welfare states do not simply have. This was mentioned with pride.

“I do not believe that the Ministry of Finance took any Western countries as an example when working on second pillar for pensions. The Ministry of Finance have always said that they have such an innovative system that other countries in EU should just shut up. Western countries are so outdated in their thinking- so they should just shut up.”

Even though this Social Ministry expert is taking a slightly ironic attitude towards Estonian Ministry of Finance, her narrative nevertheless illustrates the underlining of Estonia’s innovative side. She basically said that the Ministry of Finance claims that the Estonian pension system is so innovative that no other country in EU has it. She also indicated that the Ministry of Finance thinks that Western countries have rather stagnant social systems and are perhaps unable to go along with the newest developments. This exemplifies a stance that was voiced by several experts, towards many Western states and what is regarded as the conservative systems of theirs.

“We are so flexible in Estonia, we do everything. Not because we are indifferent. Why are many countries against innovation? Take Germany with its federal states. To make one small change, they have to employ millions of people. We manage it fast. When EHIC was introduced, in 2004, I remember we were convinced that it is going to be electronic card. Then they introduced a regular card and we asked if there was really such an uproar because of regular card? We secretly hoped that it is going to be electronic, but then we understood that we had to accept this plastic card and then we worked it through and sent it to people within two months. Everyone else was in shock and telling us that they are still discussing how they are going to use EHIC and then make forum about how to start. We are not thinking like this in Estonia. We have the mentality that well- we have to do this, then we draw a time plan with all the activities and then we complete it.”

Estonia is hold to the fore not only as innovative but also as flexible, effective and high-tech. Another high-tech innovation brought up in the interviews was e-residency that was launched 2014 in Estonia. E-residency is a program that allows for non-Estonians access to Estonian services – such as company formation, banking, payment processing, and taxation. The program is geared towards location-independent entrepreneurs such as developers and writers. As such, it is meant to attract foreign investments and encourage foreign enterprises to register themselves in Estonia. To sum up one could say that the underlining of innovations, high-tech, effectiveness, and flexibility forms what we can call a logic of development. This can in turn be seen as a part of the desire of belonging to the West.

In the narrations concerned with Estonia's external relations there were also many utterances on the relation to EU. The overall message in these were that Estonia's welfare system is EU friendly – which is in line with Estonian policies aiming at presenting Estonia as a “model case” in EU. The promotion of Estonia's welfare state as EU friendly is put to the fore by describing the Estonian social system as a business-model – using words as innovative, high tech rather talking about social aspects of the welfare state. This underlining of the Europeanness of the Estonian social system can hence be seen as a part of the logic of development.

The simultaneous branding of Estonia as developed and thereby Western and as EU friendly was not only done by underlining the innovative, flexible, high-tech and adaptive features of the system. As we saw above it was also done by contrasting the Estonian model with old Western states and what was described as their more rigid welfare systems. In this dialogicity the Western countries were used as the counterparts against which Estonia stood out not only as developed, but also as *better* developed than many old western welfare states.

The experts in the interviews seem to negotiate Estonia's position among the Western states, despite the Western states common history of welfare state development in the 1950-60ies. This is done when the experts distance themselves from the welfare models developed during this period and when they support this distancing with innovation arguments. Rather than making claims of belonging to a common history of western welfare – which Estonia does not have – the experts claims belonging to West based on ‘a desired future’. This desired future is one of Western Europe including Estonia, where the western countries has to follow the Estonian example and become more innovative and flexible – in order to be able to compete with for example US and Asian countries. There were furthermore strong assumptions that these ideals were shared among Western countries.

The logic of development – and the active wish to market the Estonian system as innovative, flexible and business-like – also involved rewriting its image before the Western states. When the expert above mentions that “everybody” was so surprised that Estonia managed to introduce EHIC so fast, she for example gives voice to the idea that Western countries have a rather negative view of Estonia. The experts often referred to Western discourses as treating Eastern Europe as one entity. Furthermore, they often referred to power dynamics and

hierarchies in EU. Many of the attempts to vision Estonia as a Western country were made by engaging in dialogue with the supposed image that Western states had on Estonia and with the perceived hierarchies within EU. Following expert, working in EURES, is explaining this by using the example of Finland:

“We (EURES) go to Finland to introduce Estonia and recruit Finish IT specialists. They are often miffed because they are used to Estonians coming there. So, we have to explain to them that the situation is not that bad in Estonia and one can easily live out of IT specialist salary. Those that have come, however, are very happy with their choice.”

The expert puts to the fore the importance of challenging the Finnish picture of Estonia in order to be able to recruit Finnish workers for Estonian IT enterprises. She is referring to a certain power-dynamics between the two countries by stating that Finns are used to Estonians coming to Finland, rather than vice versa. Hence Finland is referred to as having an image of Estonia as a sending country and of itself as the wealthy receiving country. Indeed, currently Finland is the primary destination for Estonian migrants, employing around 15000 Estonian commuters and housing many more. However, after the collapse of Nokia and other smaller enterprises, the Finish economy has suffered a rough patch. This has created a situation where power dynamics are seemingly reversed and where the expert picture Finland of today as having a hard time buying into Estonian developments. This is in turn described as calling for more work for Estonian agencies – in order to reverse the old image of Estonia.

Even though the quote above only describes the Finnish case, other countries were mentioned later on in this interview. This was for example the case when the expert pinpointed the need to rewrite Estonian image in order to attract more highly skilled employees to the country. Hence the strong underlining of Estonia as innovative and high-tech can be seen as in dialogicity with a negative image of Eastern Europe that challenges the picture of Estonia as well developed.

The image of Estonia as highly developed and thus as part of West was not only challenged from outside though, but also from inside. Several experts were describing internal problems, such as lack of services to support the elderly and to counteract poverty etc.: “I think the prime

problem in Estonia are low salaries. People are selling themselves whole day and are getting such a ridiculous salary.” The interviewee above is mentioning that one of the biggest problems of Estonia is poverty. It is also stressed throughout the interview that this poverty is not the result of people being unwilling to work, but rather receiving low salaries. Furthermore, the interviewee mentioned low salaries as one of the motivations as to why it would not be fair to increase the level of social benefits in Estonia. According to her, that would leave people, who despite their hard work earn similar amount of money, to a disadvantageous situation. The need to keep social benefits low is hence motivated by arguments of fairness, in which ‘each group should take the consequences of poverty’ and ‘people not working do not deserve to receive more salary than those who are working’.

The talk about poverty is usually alleviated in Estonian public discourse by the talk about the development. The rhetoric seems to be that ‘we have to suffer in order to grow’. The same rhetoric has been mentioned by other researchers in relation to austerity measures during the economic crisis such as Wolfson (2008), Sippola (2015) and Bohle & Greskovits (2007). According to Woolfson (2008) the Baltic States, unlike many other Eastern European countries, reacted to the crisis by decreasing costs in almost all areas. Such measures were justified as a necessary step to deal with the crisis and achieve development and success later. Greece and other Mediterranean countries that owned large debts were publicly condemned and ridiculed. They were seen as enjoying the present at the cost of the future, whereas Estonia was seen as heading to the opposite way. The arguments on development has made it possible to negotiate the potential problems in present Estonia, as for example low salaries and low benefits. Because framed by the logic of development and its assumptions on innovation etc. these problems can be viewed as tiny compared to the success to come. While the internal problems do challenge the efforts of branding Estonia as a developed Western country in a short-term perspective, this branding in the long run will position Estonia in the frontline of a desired and westernized future. However, this position in the West is not achieved by adopting the welfare models of Western states, which are often seen as outdated, but rather by running the country like a business, similarly to US. Thereby Estonia is also put to the fore as a unique European country.

The belonging of Estonia – a discourse of westernisation

To sum up, the discourse on the belonging of Estonia – the outwards discourse where Estonia's position inside EU and its relation to other EU countries – is constituted of a dominant logic of East vs. West. This is made visible in existential assumptions about the Western states as being in power both with regards to economy and social status, of having other interests than the Eastern states and of counteracting inflow of Eastern cheap EU labour migrants. Basically, it is built on existential assumptions on Estonia and Estonian EU mobile citizens as being excluded from the West – and as being excluded on the base of class (economy) and ethnicity (the social status ascribed to Estonianess).

But the discourse on the belonging of Estonia and its EU mobile citizens is also built by a logic of development. It claims recognition of Estonia as belonging to west, building on value assumptions of Estonia as innovative, flexible, EU-adaptive and high-tech. It does not only position Estonia as Western, but in some regards also as more western than the Western countries themselves – or as a unique European country running its welfare system in line with a US model. It hence tries to combat exclusion based on the status of class and ethnicity and rather positions Estonia in a sought-after future of being in the western frontiers. The discourse on the belonging of Estonia that can hence be said to be a discourse of Westernisation.

Paradoxically though, the narratives of development, the descriptions of Western states as protectionist and the complaints of the uneven power relations between East and West – that are generated by the logic of recognition– uses the logic of power periphery and power centre. In these narrations, we can thus see a reproduction of the same dichotomisation of Estonia and West that the Estonian experts themselves try to counter act when they use the logic of recognition. The logic of recognition as well as the logic of power periphery and power centre are hence contradictory, where the former challenges the latter. But at the same time, they form two sides of Estonia's outwards discourse belonging – two sides of the discourse of Westernisation.

Who belongs to Estonia and its welfare system?

The narratives of the Estonian experts did not only consist of the described outwards directed discourse regarding the belonging of Estonia, but also of an inwards directed discourse regarding who should belong to Estonia and its welfare system. This discourse was displayed when the experts directed their gaze inwards towards their own system and when they talked about immigration to their own welfare state.

A logic of the national – class, ethnicity and race as Estonian categories of belonging

So, what about the views on inbound migration, that is on immigration to Estonia? Who is the desired migrant and who is perceived as belonging to Estonia?

As Estonia is in favour of free movement and has until recently been suffering from depopulation and labour shortage (Aidukaite 2013, SCB) one could maybe anticipate most sorts of immigration being viewed as welcome. However, in the dominating Estonian discourse, immigration from non-EU countries has rather been discouraged. There is on the one hand an awareness that migration from countries outside EU probably *has* to be encouraged due to the population situation, and on the other hand very mixed feelings about such migration (see e.g. Nordic-Baltic Labour Migration Conference, Nordic Council, Tallinn 150326).

Very few experts actually mentioned immigration from countries outside EU. There was some talk about Ukrainian seamstresses coming to work in Estonia and of the potential of migration from countries such as Belorussia and Ukraine, but still comparatively little discussion on such matters. Since the citizens from outside EU do not qualify for portability rights, it could as well be, that non-EU immigration was not taken up for these reasons.

The immigration promoted in official discourse is above all return migration, that is Estonian born people moving back to Estonia (see e.g. Nordic-Baltic Labour Migration conference, Nordic Council, Tallinn 150326). All experts seemed to agree that this is the direction taken in the official politics. One debate to which the interviewees related was a political campaign called "*Talents home*", which was launched in 2010 by the Estonian president. The main

message of the campaign was “*we expect our highly skilled migrants home*”. In this campaign, it was highly skilled Estonian born people who had been abroad educating themselves or working who were the desired migrants – or more precisely the desired returnees. But as commented on, with the “*Talent home*”- campaign as example, this strive for promoting return migration seems to be more visible on a rhetoric level than on a practical level.

“Well, the return was discussed like. ‘Hurray, let’s bring all the talents home’. This was quite declarative only. I think in reality nothing was done. I know that in Poland really they offered place of living and work, but I think in Estonia it was only a declaration.”

Even though the Social Ministry expert above concludes that the “*Talents home*”-strategy itself was not successful, she also refers to other sectors, where the state is trying to control outmigration.

“One of the areas where they consciously work on bringing people back is medicine. State is consciously working on improving the salaries in this sector. There are landmarks on when it has to be at a certain level. They compare with Finland and assume that if salaries in Estonia are on that level, then these doctors are not going away so easily.”

As the expert mentions, only certain areas such as IT or medicine are dealt with in the rhetoric on attracting returnees, whereas there is very little effort on other areas. This also went for the “*Talent home*” program which focused on highly skilled Estonians residing abroad. This casting of high skilled as the desired returnees, initiated protest among low skilled migrants, who found that it was insulting that no one talked about bringing back the bus drivers or construction workers. However, there has been no official response to the protest and even though there is a significant lack of workers in areas such as metal work, the targeted groups are still professionals, mostly working in medicine and IT sector.

Those migrants who are seen as desired are hence first and foremost returnees and among these above all highly skilled from certain sector such as IT and medicine. As will be discussed more in depth below this rhetoric of the desired return migrant can be seen as generated by the logic of development – as highly skilled returnees can be seen as a way of proving that

Estonia in fact is a highly developed Western country or at least bringing Estonia one step closer to this position.

The rhetoric on highly skilled returnees also sends a very specific message on belonging to Estonians working abroad, namely that they are desired only if they have certain services they can provide to the state. The Estonian inward discourse of belonging hence seems to produce a very narrow sample of migrants who are seen as desired and as belonging – based on criteria such as class and ethnicity. Interesting enough was that Russian-speakers – who forms a relatively large share of the emigrating Estonian population and therefore also a relatively large share of the potential returnees – were hardly mentioned by experts. This means that we do not know if they were considered as part of desired defined returnees or not and what role nationality and ethnicity actually plays here.

Even if the “*Talent home*” debates have not risen the amounts of returnees in any bigger scale, it seems to have had some impact on who is staying and who is emigrating. According to Anniste and Tammaru (2014) the share of low skilled people among Estonian emigrants is bigger than among overall population. This indicates that the share of high skilled people staying should also be bigger than among the overall population. If this is the case it would make Estonia one of the few Eastern European countries not suffering from brain drain – as emigrants are more likely to be low skilled than high skilled.

In the talk about attracting people in medical and IT sector to return, the strategies mentioned for doing this is mainly focus on increasing the salaries. The arguments seem to be very much that people are only leaving for materialist reasons, and if they could earn equal salary in their home country, they would stay. It is also interesting that there is no mentioning of the social welfare system or working conditions as potential reasons for migrants to stay abroad. Raising salaries could be seen as a practical strategy, where the state does not have to deal with the wider problems, but can direct its policies to few sectors only. It also conveys that the migration of other types of workers (low skilled or highly skilled but not in prioritized field) is not considered problematic. This attitude seems to be in line with the earlier articles on winners and losers in Estonia after the fall of socialism, which suggest that the losers were

largely people in the countryside, Russian-speakers and older people (Titma 1998, Narusk & Hanson 1999 etc.).

It is hence assumed that pure material, utilitarian necessities push people to move, while a logic of the national seems to govern the view on people's reasons to stay and to return. It is for example assumed that people return because they feel a sense of duty and of belonging to Estonia. Saar and Jakobson (2015) have noted that even though different political parties in Estonia takes different stances towards migration, the official politics seems to be heading in a neoliberal direction described by former minister in Estonia, Hanno Pevkur: "It is good if people go and explore the world, but they will also come back as they have done their exploring" (in Sippola 2015). This belief in potential return and the parallel framing of emigration as temporary takes off the need to do something about it. Emigration is hence described as connected to the individual, rather than related to social problems, while immigration should be constituted of young, highly-skilled and also Estonian-speaking people (even if it is his/her second language).

The narratives on who belongs to Estonia are hence built on assumptions that Estonia is supporting EU free movement and is an open country. Simultaneously there are assumptions that certain kinds of immigrants to Estonia are better than others. Many experts did mention that the society seems to be against accepting refugees, but distanced themselves from this debate. Regarding other kinds of migration from outside Europe, several experts mentioned that Estonia most likely will *have to* start importing such workforce – when it came to needed low skilled works. In this case the preferred immigrants are those that are considered to be 'closer to our culture', such as Slavic immigrants from countries such as Ukraine, Belorussia. As mentioned European immigrants are described as even more welcome, especially if they are employed in sectors such as IT, finances, medicine etc. – as the arrival of such professionals is part of a strategy to make Estonia more 'Western'. To sum up there seem to be racialized, ethnicized and classed categories of belonging at work in the Estonian inwards discourse of belonging - which makes up for a quite narrow sample of people seen as belonging. One could say that there is a clear preference for 'white' immigrants that are perceived of as non-problematic. This idea of non-problematic immigrants did not least involve returning Estonians – where clearly such groups as highly-skilled and non-dependent migrants were

welcome, while the rest were disregarded. The logic of development hence here intersects with the logic the national in depicting high skilled ethnic Estonian returnees as the most desired immigrants. As will be discussed below, the logic of development furthermore intersects with the logic of self-reliance as this logic defines the desired migrant as a self-maintaining – which minimizes stately responsibilities.

The logic of development and the logic of East vs West operating inwards

The logic of development and the logic of East vs. West that shape the Estonian outwards discourse of belonging, turned out to also underpin the inwards discourse on who is belonging to Estonia. These logics thereby also contribute in shaping the image of the desired immigrant. This is visible in the political debates on attracting highly skilled workforce from other EU countries as well as from outside Europe that have surfaced recently, despite the above. The e-residency program launched 2014 is meant to attract foreign investments and encourage foreign enterprises to register themselves in Estonia. As mentioned e-residency is geared towards location-independent entrepreneurs – such as developers and writers. It allows non-Estonians access to Estonian services such as company formation, banking, payment processing, and taxation. As such it can be seen as related to the logic of development.

Furthermore, especially in connection to Brexit, Estonian economists have started discussing the potential of the country to attract some enterprises, especially from the finance sector, that formerly resided in UK. Such developments were depicted in some of the interviews as the ideal case scenario for the country – even if some were more positive and hopeful in relation to these than others. There is however a vivid rhetoric saying that ‘No-one wants to come to Estonia’. This rhetoric seems to be governed by the earlier discussed logic of East vs. West depicting Estonia as an Eastern country in an unfavourable economic and status position and puts a lid to all discussions on attracting migrants from other EU countries. The idea that Estonia as a country is unable to attract immigrants from other EU countries fuels the idea that the country has to do a lot to draw back its lost national workforce. It hence fuels the discourse of belonging geared towards returnees.

“Nobody comes to Estonia. Those few people that want to come here, we make no limitations. We also do not discriminate based on citizenship. I mean inside EU.”

When the expert above comments that Estonia does not discriminate based on citizenship she wants to point out that Estonia hands out its social benefits based on residence and that there are no limiting rules that involve one’s citizenship – that is, she holds to the fore that it regulation-wise is easy to immigrate to Estonia. Both the official political discourse and the expert discourse in relation to incoming workforce from other EU countries seems to be that Estonia *should* encourage people (primarily highly skilled young people from certain fields) to come and that Estonia actually *does* encourage people to come – even though very few actually do. This was for example visible in the earlier quote where one expert was talking about attracting Finnish IT specialists to Estonia. Drawing highly skilled foreign workforce from other EU countries is hence meant to create Estonia as a developed, high-tech country. It seems that Estonia is envisioned as in the future being able to attract highly skilled Westerners to the country, while there are also narratives on the country not yet being there. Hence there is a fantasmatic side of the logic of development that is intersecting with the social logic of East vs. West in shaping not only the outwards discourse on where Estonia belongs, but also the inwards discourse on the desired immigrant and who belongs to Estonia. The desired migrant is classed (highly skilled) and ethnized (Western or at least culturally close) and white (race). Next section turns to the expert narrations on the Estonian welfare state in relation to the Estonian citizens.

A logic of self-reliance – belonging to the welfare state as connected to class

As described in the beginning of the chapter, the Estonian welfare state has developed in a neoliberal direction. This development was much negotiated in the interviews. The negotiation was displayed for example in the ways the Estonian experts related to outwards migration. It turned out that experts gave rather little negative attention to free EU migration and instead describes Estonia as supporting it.

“Estonia regards the free movement of people as extremely vital. In EU direction Estonia has always said that free movement is something we support. This is the official standpoint of the country and looking at the demographics, then we should be worried that people in the working age are going away. This is

contradictory.....However Estonia has never backed down from the position that they support the free movement.”

As discussed in the introduction, Estonian EU migration is mainly emigration *from* Estonia to other EU countries – an emigration that has been quite significant. Free EU migration on Estonia’s part hence mainly concerns outward migration. Even though there is no strong discourse of worry on free movement present in the interviews. We can see that the expert above is initially talking about the official discourse being supportive on free movement. She is however also expressing a concern that such a supportive attitude towards migration might become a demographic problem. Even though she points out that such demographic concern has not really influenced the public discourse.

Estonian politicians have rarely expressed concerns about people moving away. Rather it is assumed that some of these migrants will be returning. As we saw above one of the interviewed expert however indicated that perhaps Estonia should be worried about the large out flux of people. Even if this *is* a concern among certain circles, the discourse of worry has rarely appeared in public. Rather, as the expert say, it has been communicated that migration is useful for Estonia – being a way to further develop Estonia and envision it as a Western state. And as we seen above, it is assumed that at least some of the highly skilled workers will return and bring with them the Western knowledge and attitudes.

The positive view on outbound migration and free EU movement can be seen as unpinned by a logic of self-reliance, built on assumptions that people should take care of themselves and not burden the system. In this logic emigration becomes a way for people to be self-sufficient and to not lean on the Estonian system. Hence one interpretation of the positive attitude towards free EU movement is that emigration is seen as one of the ways for Estonian citizens to stay non-dependent in relation to the welfare system. This finding is supported by previous research that has stated that Estonia seems to have taken an approach on emigration that is based on the view that it is the *duty* of the citizens to find the ways to support themselves if the state is doing bad (Sippola 2013). It should be noted though that some experts challenged the view of the Estonian citizens as utilitarian and having to be totally self-sufficient. They did this by bringing forth issues such as the problems receiving benefits in Estonia, Estonia’s

economic problems etc. But even though there were some questioning of whether citizens should be and could be expected to be self-sufficient, the self-reliance logics clearly dominated the narratives.

The non-problematized view on free EU-movement and on emigrating Estonian citizens could furthermore be understood in relation to the above described discourse of Westernisation. Even though the dominant view seems to be that non-self-maintaining citizens should emigrate to lessen the burden on the state, there were in the complaints on western states' protectionism also an underlying assumption that Estonian citizens had the *right* to work in West. There was in some sense assumptions that Estonian citizens should have the permission to belong to West.

It is furthermore interesting that there is no mentioning of gender or family in this logic of self-reliance. Rather there is a heavy stress on the fact that every individual in the society needs to be self-maintaining. Self-reliance related to the individual and not the family is in line with particularities of Estonian society, such as for example a high number of single mothers. Even in terms of migration there is little reference to any kind of gender or family support. It is only mentioned by one expert that some transnational families rely on men working abroad to support the family.

However, there seems to be a certain class bias in the logics of self-reliance, especially in relation to free movement. The kind of free movement which is described by politicians, seems to always involve individuals who are agents. The topic of 'forced movement' is rarely discussed, neither is the fact that Southern Estonian villages are emptying out of people. Rather an image of the Estonian mobile EU citizen is someone who's choice to move has been motivated by concerns other than financial necessity. The discursively envisioned Estonian mobile EU citizen is hence someone who is literally free and economically non-dependent.

As we have seen above in the sections on the desired immigrant as a (highly skilled) returnee there seems to be assumptions that those who return should take responsibility for producing some value to the country. Here we can remind us of rhetoric on the cherry picking of migrants that would be useful for the country and of the wording of the "*Talents home*" campaign

mentioned above. It did not say “we *want* our highly skilled migrants home” but instead “we *expect* our highly skilled migrants home”. This indicates that the (highly skilled) EU movers are seen as having *the duty* to return. This line up with the classed and ethnicized categories of belonging discussed above, as well as with the neoliberalist paradigm where citizens are seen as owing their state. This finding is also in line with previous research, where Sippola (2013) has stated that the relationship between the state and individual in Estonia seems to be describable with the statement “Do not ask what the country can do for you, ask what you can do for the country”. Hence the Estonian version of the logic of non-dependency does not produce a discourse on what people deserve but rather what they owe, and assumptions that you as an Estonian citizen are not only responsible for your own well-being, but *also* for the well-being of the Estonian state.

To sum up, the logic of self-reliance builds on assumptions that people are responsible for their own well-being, should be non-dependent of stately welfare and that emigration is a way for people to take care of themselves and not burden the Estonian system. This logic hence produces neoliberalist takes in the Estonian welfare system. It furthermore builds on existential assumptions that citizens are in debt to the state and value assumptions that Estonian citizens are thus not only responsible for their own well-being but also for the well-being of the state. According to this, returnees should take responsibility and produce value for the country.

As will be discussed below the logic of self-reliance also seems to intersect with, and be strengthened by, a logic of mistrust.

A logic of mistrust – an ethnization of Estonian citizens?

As mentioned there was an ongoing negotiation around the neoliberal direction in the development of Estonian welfare system. On the one hand the neoliberal development of the welfare system was supported, on the other hand its negative sides were brought out.

“Our social benefits are very lousy. So, if those migrants that have worked in Finland cannot apply for unemployment benefits over there, they lose a great deal of their income. Also in Estonia, one can receive unemployment benefits only for certain period of time. On one hand this motivates people to find work, on the

other hand if someone cannot find work it is very complicated to manage. I have heard that in Finland many do not even want to go to work because unemployment benefits are sufficiently high.”

As visible from the quote above the expert is quite critical of Estonian neoliberal welfare system, pointing out that the benefits are “very lousy”. But at the same time, she, as well as other interviewees, could be positive to the system. It was for example mentioned that the approach with low social benefits motivated Estonian citizens to work, while Western states with social-democratic systems were critically described as allowing its citizens to live out of social benefits for years. The latter can be said to mirror what can be called a logic of mistrust – a logic where the own citizens are basically suspected of wanting to take advantage of the social system. This logic of mistrust was visible also in other interviews.

“People would start to scheme so much. It is terrible. We have a lot of entrepreneurs. They would employ their wives and pay them high, maybe they would not even receive salary, but they would only pay social tax. Our health insurance was forced to pay out one million kroons⁴ once as a benefit, because you have to pay. Currently people are also scheming a lot, they are calling and asking, when it would be most beneficial for me to get pregnant. It is not that people are all happy, those that create these conflicts are those that earn really high salaries and get maximum benefits and if they do not receive something then they will already protest.”

When the expert quoted above refers to Estonians that are trying to get out the maximum level of benefits – even though they are not in direct need for money – it can be seen as related to the described utilitarian materialist practice vivid during the 1990ies. Hence, on the one hand the logic of mistrust can be understood as closely related to such values that are still common in Estonian society. On the other hand, this logic inflicts on how Estonian public administration relates to people. Instead of seeing people as potentially in need of help, there is a bit of distancing and a bit of suspicion in regards to people’s motives. A call to the ministry done in relation to one’s concern about livelihood (needing to pay the loans etc.) might therefore automatically be connected by the experts to scheming and greediness.

Hence, the logic of mistrust is built on assumptions that Estonian citizens may want to take advantage of their own social system and might live out of social benefits if not held back by

⁴ Kroon was the Estonian currency before the adoption of Euros.

the state. One important division should be made, nevertheless. Some experts seem to be talking about citizens that are in direct need of money and therefore play the system. But interestingly enough the mistrust seemed above all to be directed towards the well-earning strata of the society. For instance, one expert from a Social Ministry states that “I think businessmen figure out all kinds of schemes.”

Well-earning Estonians are not seen as in direct need of money, but as having the know-how as to how to benefit from the system. The low-earning Estonians in turn, are rather seen as to a degree legitimized to ‘play the system’. But they are at the same time seen as more helpless and therefore less likely to take advantage of the social benefits. As will be illustrated in the last chapter, relying on social benefits is narrated as one way of cheating the system.

However, generally the logic of mistrust fosters a view of people as potential cheaters of the system. It is built on assumptions that Estonian citizens as basically utilitarian, which ascribes Estonian citizen’s certain ethnic traits. As we will see later on these ascriptions are however also partly connected to neoliberalist perspective of Estonian citizens as being responsible for themselves and having the responsibility to find any way to manage.

A two-sided discourse of belonging containing classed, ethnized and racialized inclusion and exclusion.

One cluster of topics in the Estonian expert narratives is directed outwards and can be summed up as concerning the ambivalence about Estonia’s position in Europe. Whereas the logic of development seems to want to redraw the borders by placing Estonia as a Western country, the logics East vs. West contains several assumptions that place Estonia as (still) belonging to the East. Even when we are talking about the logics working in the inwards discourse of belonging, such a positioning comes out.

Another cluster of topics is directed inwards and concerns the conflict between neoliberal and more social-democratic approaches in Estonian welfare. This narrated conflict is underpinned by various logics. Neoliberal positions seem to be underpinned by the logic of mistrust and

the logic of development in intersection with logic of self-reliance and its assumption on citizens as owning the state. The logic of the national and East vs. West in turn seems to generate more socially oriented narratives challenging the neoliberalism of the Estonian system. The experts are often simultaneously representing both sides of the coin – even though the neoliberal stance is dominating in the narratives.

Hence, the Estonian discourse of belonging is two folded. It consists on the one hand of an outward looking part, addressing questions on where Estonia as a state should belong in geopolitical sense, and an inwards directed part addressing Estonia's welfare system and who should belong to Estonia. We will now in further detail describe how these sides of the discourse and the logics that underpin them are in dialogue with one another.

The outward looking part of the discourse, addressing questions on where Estonia as a state should belong is quite dominating – which could be discussed as an effect of Estonians position as a sending country. This part of the discourse is underpinned by a logic of East vs. West – a social and hence naturalized logic made visible in existential assumptions about the Western states as being in power both with regards to economy and social status, of having other interests than the Eastern states and of counteracting inflow of Eastern cheap EU labour migrants. Basically, it is built on existential assumptions of an East–West dichotomy and hierarchy, on Estonia and Estonian EU mobile citizens as being excluded from the West and on them as being excluded on the base of ethnicity and class. Interestingly enough, the logic East vs. West also comes out from how Estonian experts approaches the topic of immigration: when they state that they welcome highly skilled Western migrants, but simultaneously assume that nobody wants to come to Estonia. This as well, paints Estonia as a victim – as in a powerless position, stating that it is Western countries (or their citizens) who have the power to decide over Estonia's value as a country. In contrast, it is hard to imagine Western countries to engage in the narrative where they feel sorry that they are lately receiving less migrants from 'Eastern Europe' and that this must mean that their country is not valuable or attractive enough.

The logic of East vs. West intersects with the logic of development in the production of the discourse on where Estonia as a state should belong. The logic of development can be

interpreted as a political logic, as it challenges the social logic of East vs. West and the view of an East-West dichotomy and hierarchy. It does so by claiming recognition of Estonia as belonging to west, building on value assumptions of Estonia as innovative, flexible, EU-adaptive and high-tech.

This logic of development furthermore has a fantasmatic aspect attached to it, as it is a logic in which strong feelings are invested. This seems to be a protection strategy applied in order to redraw the borders of the past and really prove that Estonia now belongs to the West. But it does not only position Estonia as Western. It is also a logic of strong desires that in some regards positions Estonia as more western than the Western countries themselves – or as a unique European country running its welfare in line with a US model. It hence tries to combat exclusion based on the status of ethnicity and class and by positioning Estonia in a sought-after future of being in the western frontiers

However, it is interesting to note, that this political, and also to some respect fantasmatic logic, does not challenge the presence of the East and West dichotomy and hierarchy itself. It only challenges Estonia's belonging in this power hierarchy, the positioning of Estonia as East. Because, paradoxically, the narratives geared at recognition also use the logic of East and West. The descriptions of Western states as protectionist and the complaints of the uneven power relations between East and West reproduces the same dichotomisation of Estonia and West that the Estonian experts themselves try to counteract when they use the logic of development. The logic of East and West and the logic development hence form two sides of Estonia's outwards discourse belonging – two sides of the discourse of Westernisation.

If we then move on to *the inwards directed part of the Estonian discourse of belonging*, it addresses questions on who should belong to Estonia and its welfare system. The detected discourse states that all citizens should to such a large extent as possible manage on their own and not burden the welfare system. It is hence structured by a logic of self-reliance in relation to the state and its welfare benefits. Estonians seemed not only to be urged not to burden the state, but also to rather migrate than be such a load. And those who have migrated but are needed by the state are “expected” to come “home”. There is hence a view expressed that the citizens are in debt to the state, are owing the state. The discourse on who belongs inside

Estonia seems to be underpinned by several logics that are intersecting – such as the logic of the national, of self-reliance and of mistrust – but also the logics of East vs. West and of development. The logic on self-reliance and the assumptions that the citizens are owing the state works together with the logic of the national. The logics of self-reliance is furthermore somewhat at odds with the logics of development, which relies on advertising Estonia as developed, high-tech and liberal.

Whereas the logic of the national stands out as a social logic – something taken for granted – the logic of self-reliance seems to have a somewhat ambivalent position. It can be seen as a social logic that was prevalent most of the 1990ies and the early 2000, but that has recently been more questioned. One example of such developments is the fact that there was recently a change of government in Estonia. The neoliberal party which ruled the country for more than ten years got replaced by a coalition of more social-democratic parties. As we have also seen, the idea that citizens ought to be responsible for their own welfare is also questioned by several experts, who talk about the problems with social benefit allocations etc. This raises questions if the logic of self-reliance is developing into a political and thus challenged logic? Despite the eventual more general political challenges of the neoliberal aspects of the Estonian Welfare system, one could conclude that the logic of development, the logic of self-reliance and the logic of mistrust intersect to form a dominant tone in the narratives analysed here – and that this tone is in favour for neoliberal sides of the Estonian welfare system.

This intersection of the logic of development, the logic of self-reliance and the logic of mistrust also generate a discourse on what kinds of migrants are expected in Estonia. The preferred migrant is highly-skilled, Western (or Estonian), white and is expected to benefit the country somehow. This image is influenced not only by the logic of self-reliance though, but also by the logic of development. In this respect, there is a clear fantasmatic aspect to this logic – as it paints an image of the ideal immigrant as a non-dependent, non-problematic high-skilled Western citizen. In the cases where low skilled workforce is needed, the preference goes for Slavic non-EU countries such as Ukraine and Belorussia. This in sum means that racialized, ethnicized and classed categories of belonging builds a discourse where white, culturally close migrants are most welcome, with preference for highly skilled. The logic of East vs West underpins further the assumption that low-skilled Westerners will not come to Estonia due to

the wage difference, while there is hope to attract people from poorer Eastern European countries for such positions.

3. THE SWEDISH WELFARE SYSTEM AND ITS DISCOURSE OF BELONGING

The Swedish welfare system is historically based on the so called “Swedish Model”. This model was built in accordance to a social democratic aim to create a society with economic and social equality and justice (see e.g. Rudberg 1992). It was based on the idea that welfare services should be equally distributed, without stigmatising selectivity (Lapidus 2015). The Swedish system has however gradually been transformed, as liberal social policy alternatives have been added to the system. There has for example been a shift from viewing social policy as an investment that *releases* resources and contributes to growth to a view of social policy as something that *consumes* the resource, as well as a shift from an egalitarian ideal to an increased emphasis on freedom of choice (Hellman, Roos & Von Wright 2012). The transformation of the system also loosened up the trade union hegemony, although nearly 70 per cent of the Swedish employees today still belong to a union – making Sweden one of the most unionised countries in the world.⁵

The Swedish social security system of today can be characterised as centralised with a high degree of universality that, during the last three decades, has moved towards greater competition, individualisation and privatisation. The health service is universal, state funded pensions are high (both contributory and non-contributory) and social support is non-contributory (universal) – often with residency conditions.

This section analyses narratives of Swedish welfare experts interviewed on free EU-movement, welfare and portability issues. The aim of the analysis is to identify the Swedish discourse of belonging, the logics that underpins this discourse as well as the criteria on

⁵ <http://work.sweden.se/living-in-sweden/workers-rights-and-unions/>

inclusion and exclusion shaped in the intersection of the logics that builds the discourse. Following sections describe various logics we identified in the interviews – logics that govern ways of viewing welfare and of viewing migrants. These logics create the Swedish discourse of belonging in their intersection – and the analysis hence forms a frame for understanding the construction of the Swedish discourse of belonging and its criteria of inclusion and exclusion.

A logic of space and time related welfare – space, time and nationality as categories of belonging

One dominating and propositional assumption in the interviews is that the Swedish welfare system is generous and protects all inhabitants who are registered as residing within the national space. The national space component is for example present when one expert mentions that the purpose of the employment agency is to match jobseekers with the *national* working market, and not the European one.

“What we want to achieve is that the person looks for job on the national labour market. What you want to achieve is a matching within the labour market you are responsible for ... the Swedish labour market ... it should be low unemployment ... If a person gets a work in another country ... it doesn't lower our unemployment rate. It doesn't give more labour to our employers ... it is another employer in another country that will benefit ... of our work /laugh/ so that's why the unemployment insurance is a bit different from the overall social insurance benefits”.

The expert above denotes the existence of two separate spaces, the European and national, and motivates the policy regarding unemployment benefit by contrasting an unemployment claimant getting a job on the national market with a jobseeker getting work abroad. Getting a job on the national market is viewed as resulting in a matching of job offer and demand and consequently to reduce unemployment. Getting work abroad is however viewed as something which won't get any positive repercussion on the national labour market. The expert narratives hence indicate that the Swedish welfare system takes the nation-state or at least national space as a natural vantage point. Yet, spatiality is one prominent criteria for belonging

in the Swedish welfare system, but there seems to be a hierarchization of two spaces as shown in the quote above, where the national space seems to be higher ranked.

Although the Swedish welfare system, according to the experts, is, or at least *should* be, an all-including system – that is a system embracing *all people who are residents within in the Swedish national space* and protecting them in a fair and equal manner – there are contradictions. This is for example made clear when the experts contrast the system as it used to work with the situation today. Below one of them explains that in earlier days – before free EU migration – residents were automatically registered as belonging to the welfare system as soon as they reached the age of 16. Today it is different, the expert clarifies, as people who have not been in contact with the system and are totally unknown to the authorities can “suddenly pop up” and claim access to benefits.

“(O)ur social insurance ... we have been all-encompassing ... for Swedish citizen and we ... once we had a system that was built upon the registration with the Social Insurance Agency. So when you turned 16, you were automatically registered within a Social Insurance Agency ... and so you were socially insured ... And everyone who were here, was socially insured ... yeah ... now it is a bit different ... Now it can show up people that one ... has no idea who they are ... as ... that had not been in contact with the system here at all ... and all of sudden should have some right ... to benefits”.

So, even though the experts in general claim that the system should embrace all people who are residents within the Swedish national space, this expert makes clear that the system and its civil servants are unused of thinking in line with the (new) EU directives requiring equal treatment of Swedish citizens and EU citizens. Rather there has long been a habit of seeing the aim of the system as to protect *Swedish* citizens. In the narratives one can see how this put to fore universality – the assumption that all residents should be protected in an equal manner – is clearly collapsed into “Swedish citizen”. “Swedish citizen”, was elaborated as a person residing in Sweden and who had reached the age of 16. This hence indicates nationality, understood as political membership as a crucial category of belonging which is reinforced by the category of space. As will be discussed in the section on logics of fairness and logics of autonomy, the above contradiction can also be understood in relation to access to social security in Sweden not only being linked to residency but also to contribution through employment.

Who belongs to the Swedish Social security system is basically determined by, and also displayed in, the personal identification number system. As a matter of fact, a personal identification number (PIN) is required to enter the system. It is connected to residency – the ground condition being the “one-year residency” requirement (I6).⁶ Once you fulfil the requirements it is necessary to register at the tax office and its population register to obtain a PIN.

However, there are instance where EU mobile citizen might enter the Swedish Social security system without a PIN. This is if they are able to prove to the Social security agency that they will be resident the coming year (or more)⁷. Hence both the registration in the population register (PIN) and the option to instead register at the Swedish Social Agency is connected to requirements of Swedish residency. Being classified as inside the system is thus connected to the logics of *space* as category of belonging. But as pointed out by the experts the “one-year residency condition” means that only the EU mobile citizens who can prove that they will be staying *at least one year in Sweden* can generally get registered in the system. Beside *space*, *time* is hence a factor of importance for getting included in the Swedish system.

“If you go to the Taxes Board Office and say ‘ I have got a job here and I have a residency here ... and I have thought of staying here more than one year’ ... you will be registered from day 1 ... you will be register in the population register directly ... which means that you are part of ... all the system ... since we are so computer accustomed /---/ BUT if you get a job here ... you maybe shall conduct a short research project at university ... for 9 months and so you get here and say ‘I will be staying 9 months in Sweden, here is my contract’ ... Then you won’t be registered! WHICH means that you WON’T GET the desired Personal identity number ...”

The expert above takes up a hypothetical situation (statements of ‘irrealis’) in order to illustrate her point. She establishes a parallel between residency for more than one year and registration. This is in turn contrasted with short time residency. One interpretation of this is

⁶ The Social Insurance Agency does its own estimation if the claimant is to be seen as a resident or not. This of course leaves space for discretionary decisions. If the Agency states that the migrant’s habitual residence (what 883/2004 calls ‘centre of life’) is in Sweden, s/he would get a provisory PIN and might be entitled to resident based benefits.

⁷ A provisory PIN will be required by the Social Security Agency and provided.

that a person's intention to stay in Sweden one year or more is perceived of as equivalent with an intention to have the national space of Sweden as one's centre of life. One could hence say that there is an intersection between time and space, where residency extended in time seems to be interpreted as deciding for the Swedish national space.

Just as people are seen as belonging to the all-including Swedish welfare protection once they get a PIN, they are excluded without one. And, as underlined by the experts, people without a PIN are not excluded only from all Swedish welfare benefits and services, but also from many other parts of society – such as banks, gym halls, swimming pools, video-renting etc. This means that in practice it is nearly impossible to move around the Swedish society without a PIN and one could say that the PIN functions as an 'open sesame'. As one expert states, this was not at all the main intention with the PIN system.

“(P)opulation registration or Personal identity number are used today in Sweden in a way that was not really intend from the beginning. It is used in all possible way. So, to go to the swimming pool and buy a punch-ticket you will need a personal identity number. It might not have been the authorities or ... the government's intention when it was introduced ... for many years ago, but it has been ...

The PIN does not only open doors to sectors in society, but also makes you count as a *person*. Hence, without a PIN you are nobody. One of the experts even labelled the PIN a “magic number”, it is a number that make you exist.

(You) are ... you get a Personal identity number ... you are part of the Social security agency ... you are ... huh ... register at the Taxes Board Agency ... you can open a bank account ... you can rent a video film ... you can buy a gym membership ... you can get to the county council and get health care ... everything just functions ... you just say the magic number and all doors open up ...

The expert here draws a chain of equivalence between the PIN and access to mundane activities. Doing this she also collapses 'the population register' with 'access to a gym'. One interpretation of this is that the PIN here is viewed as a mayor threshold for entering the Swedish Social Welfare system. But the experts' opinions on this differed. While the majority of the experts agreed on the PIN being mayor threshold for entering the Swedish system the interviewed civil servants at the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs estimate the Swedish

social system as a system with few thresholds. This, they explain by establishing causality between the small size of the country and a simplicity to access the Swedish social security system:

“(S)ince Sweden is a small country ... but with a long tradition of migration so we have designed a social insurance system that is relatively easy to come in, there are not so many thresholds built in it.”

As mentioned earlier the experts seldom gave voice to critic of the system. But when they did have criticism it was often that of the PIN being a threshold. This is the case in the example below where the expert explains the difficulty faced by mobile EU citizens to access health care in Sweden via a hypothetical example in which she draws a relation of causality between getting access to health care and being in possession of a PIN.

“According to the EU regulations you are still entitled to ... for instance health care ... But when you go to the hospital or try to meet a doctor, if you have a personal identity number to declare ... so they don’t know who you are ... and THEN ... there might be problems ... It is something that have to be solve ... it cannot be like that ... it is persons who are entitled to heath care ... huh ... but at the reception if one can’t give its personal identity number there will be ... some problems ... so in principle ... SO you are in the same situation as ... whatever tourist ... so ... though you are no a tourist ... so it is very strange ...”.

One could conclude that both the standpoints above have something to them, as a new regulation has been introduced in order to facilitate for EU mobile citizens without PIN to access health care. EU mobile citizens with short time employment and without PIN that are holders of a document issued by the Swedish Social Insurance Agency, will have the same right to access health care as holders of a PIN. As the document has to be applied for, this solution hence requires planning beforehand. The procedure is reserved for EU mobile citizen with short time employment contract in Sweden and concern only access to health care. The document provided by the Social Insurance Agency acts as a ‘bridge’ between EU and the Swedish national laws, so that migrants who work in Sweden less than 12 months (with no intention or possibility to work longer in the country) are somehow protected, but not completely ‘included’.

“According to EU residency regulation ... you are resident even if you are working only nine months and plan to stay nine months ... but according to the Swedish population registration system so ... you are not residing here ... before ... before you are saying that you will be staying at least 12 months or more ...”

EU rules require a shorter length of stay for including EU movers in a national social security system than the Swedish twelve-month residency condition. EU rules furthermore state that it's the person's geographical centre of interest that should count, not the national registers. Hence, the PIN-system is in conflict with many EU directives. Interesting enough, this did not seem to worry the experts to any great extent.

Another interesting aspect, when it comes to the logics of space and time related welfare in relation to EU, is that an Advisory Para States Organization, such as SOLVIT whose aim is to facilitate free movement within the EU, has its vantage point in the nation-state and paradoxically works on *national* premises. One could hence say that SOLVIT in its work is reproducing the same dichotomy that is voiced in the expert narratives, the one of the nation state versus EU.

To sum up, one of the identified logics within the Swedish discourse of belonging is that of space and time related welfare. One consequence of this logic is that settled way of life is favoured and short time and circular mobile EU citizen will have difficulties to belong to the Swedish welfare system. Even if this logic includes foremost *space* and *time* as categories of belonging, *nationality* (in terms of a political membership) is in practice a category of belonging – although it is more disguised. As will be discussed in the end of this chapter, this logic intersects with the logics discussed below in forming a Swedish discourse of belonging.

A logic of equality– inclusion based on space, time and ethnicity.

Another prominent assumption in the expert narratives are existential assumptions concerning equal treatment. Treating everybody the same way is in the expert narratives interpreted as creating equality. This is in line with the official and statutory principle of equal treatment which governs many of the Swedish welfare regulations. One can hence talk of a logic of equality within the Swedish discourse of belonging.

The principle of equal treatment and the logic of equality, contradictory enough, proved to be most prominent regarding Swedish citizen and people being in possession of a PIN. Thereby it underpins the logic of space and time related welfare and categories of belonging such as space, time and maybe also ethnicity.

But even if the logic of equality was mostly vivid in relation to people registered within the system, and thus holding a PIN, it was also taken up in discussions on mobility within EU. Mobility within EU was often discussed in terms of equal treatment and non-discrimination's principles. As the expert below states: EU mobile and Swedish citizen should be treated in equal manners.

"(W)e shall keep in mind: regulations we want to be valid for everyone, shall also be valid for people in Sweden who move to another country ... not only for person who come to Sweden from another country. So, we can't have a regulation which is very strict for people coming here and generous, for people from us, who move to other countries. It would be very interesting to see how to motivate ... for instance that Rumanian who come here ... they won't get any protection while Swedes who move there, get protection. It is well not functioning like that. It is equal for everyone ..."

The expert argues for equality by taking up a hypothetical example through which she draws a chain of equivalence between migrants coming to Sweden from other countries and Swedish people migrating. "Strictness" and "no security" for those coming to Sweden from other countries is here contrasted with "generosity" and "security" for Swedish people *moving within the EU*.

Even the provisory PIN that can be issued to people who has not yet got an ordinary PIN, is motivated with the logic of equality.

"The temporary numbers are something that the individual should obtain for his/her own sake ... but it is not what they were design to ... they were introduced so that authorities could handle persons without any personal identity number in an equal way."

The provisory PIN is in this example put forward as something needed for the welfare authorities to be able to treat everybody in the same way and one can here see how the logic

of equality intersects with the logic of space and time related welfare. People need to register in the Swedish system – which is linked to *space* in term of residency conditions – not only to be included but *also* so they can be made equal in accordance to the logic of equality.

When asked to define the trickiest question of the Swedish welfare state in relation to EU migration one expert answered that it was to come in touch with all those EU mobile citizens who were entitled to different welfare benefits but who did not have knowledge of these rights. The fact that EU mobile citizens often do not register with the Swedish Social Insurance agency until they need some sort of social benefits was actually expressed as a problem by several experts – as this created inequality. These formulations can hence be seen as guided by the logics of equality.

(The problem) is that we don't always know that the person is here, they don't manifest themselves to the Social security agency until later on when they want access to some benefit.

The underlying propositional assumption formulated here, is that EU mobile citizens who registered late are not only missing out on their chances on equality and the same treatment as Swedish citizens. They are also causing problems by challenging the functioning of the Swedish welfare administrations and questioning its smooth running. To challenge the functioning of the Swedish welfare system, is nevertheless no option. The eventuality of overlooking the Swedish fundamental principle of equality, and not treating everybody a like but instead adapt to the individuals in line with EU law, would, according to an expert at an Advisory Para States organization, result in more inequality even though the intention might be to render the system more equal. Hence, making the Swedish system more and more individually fitted, in line with EU recommendation, might result in the apparition of two sorts of migrants and inequalities in relation to these: on the one hand the ones who are educated or well off and thus can understand the system or pay for help and on the other hand the other ones. Infringements on the principle of equal treatment furthermore permeates the expert's statements regarding the Roma immigration to Sweden:

“(O)ne reason why it has been difficult is ... it depends somehow on our Swedish legislation here ... in which responsibility for this migration ... ends up on the local authorities board ... and then it is nearly made for a

situation with a high grade of unequal treatment of a national issue /.../ It had been realized that it is a national problem which required national solutions ... but there is still big difference in the treatment of the Roma immigration ... some get housing others may not, some are expelled from occupied place, others may stay, yeah ... some ... some children are allowed to go to school, others might not”.

What is at stake for this interviewee is the fact that the treatment of the Roma immigration is depending on municipalities’ policies, this as the local authorities are responsible for social assistance in Sweden. This results in social assistance to Roma migrants differing in different parts of the country – which in turn violates the principle of equal treatment and hence the logics of equality.

The logic of equality was furthermore present in relation to gender, for example when the provision of parental benefit in Sweden was discussed in the interviews. This is not surprising as the principle of equal treatment of men and woman is prominent in the Swedish system and in its regulations. The rules state that both parents are entitled to parental benefit for 240 days each. Sixty of those days are reserved for each of the parents, meaning that none of the parents can take 480 days. The maximum any of the parents can get is 420 days since the remaining 60 days are reserved for the other parent.⁸

“Equality aspects ... that we consider that both partner should be working (...) The idea is that fathers should be at home with children.”

To conclude, besides the logic of space and time related welfare, there is another dominating logic generating the Swedish discourse of belonging, namely the logic of equality. As discussed, this logic contains space, time as well as ethnicity as categories of belonging (Swedish or European political membership). Europeanness is a criteria for inclusion, but is not self-sufficient as it has to intersect with the criteria of space/time or even class (status of employment) to act as an including criteria. Hence, we could conclude that there is a disguised ethnic factor for inclusion in the sense that equality is geared towards residing inhabitants, which are predominantly nationals. This category of belonging sometimes also comes in conflict with other logics in the discourse, such as the logic of fairness discussed below.

⁸ If a parent has the sole custody of a child, s/he would be eligible for the 480 days.

A logic of fairness – inclusion based on class and nationality

The experts often underlined that the Swedish system has been set up to be fair and another identified logic governing the interview narratives is what we can call a logic of fairness. This logic is grounded on a value assumption mentioned by all the experts, namely that those who contribute shall be sure to receive what they are entitled to. While all residents according the logic of equality should be equally treated and entitled, only residing people who have been contributing to the system should be entitled to earning-related benefit according to the logic of fairness. Further, as pinpointed by the experts, a difference is made in the welfare system between desirable and undesirable situations to be cover up.

”... what society should cover ... are the situation we want should occur ... for instance that you become a parent. We think that it is important that society cover up such situations ... and therefore we have child benefit and therefore we have child care allowance and therefore do we have a long parental leave period ... at the same time we cover up for situation we don't want to happen but that we know everyone has a risk to face, such as unemployment.”

The desirable situations are depicted as situations that concerns “everybody” residing on the Swedish soil. They are furthermore viewed as “natural” (reproduction and health). In these situations, people according to the regulations should get benefits that are universal and flat-rate. These are also situations where the experts voice that it is justified, at least partly, for people to depend on the state. The undesirable situations are situations that are viewed as “not natural”, but that people may risk encountering. They are situations related to benefits only meant for people who have contributed to the system (earning-based benefits). In other word, the benefits related to desirable situations are meant for everyone (but with a minima level) and seems to be governed by the logics of equality. The benefits seen as undesirable are conditional and depends on contribution/work and are rather governed by the logics of fairness. The conflict between the two logics is made visible in the use of pronouns in one of the interviews. When speaking about universal residency based benefit the interviewee below for example uses the Swedish generic pronoun for “one” in the sense everybody. But when speaking about earning related benefits, that is benefits to whom only people who

contributed are entitled, the interviewee uses the individual Swedish pronoun for “you”. We have illustrated this by marking the pronouns of the quote in grey.

”So, there are some benefits **one** get because **one** dwells here in the country and there are other benefits, we consider **one** should be entitled to because **one** has been working here, contributed in a way. And the difference between the two ... benefits is partly ... they are part of ... two social insurance legislations ... the labour based benefits are often related to income while the residency based benefits are on a minimum level ... so we think that **one** should ... **one** should be entitled to health care no matter if **one** has been working or not. It is a minimum level. We consider that **everyone** should be entitled to child benefit regardless if they are working or not ... However, unemployment benefits are relatively labour based. **You** need partly to have been working in order to be entitled ... it is not enough ... to be unemployed and been looking for job. **YOU** need to show that **you** have been working before ... and here comes the loss of income ... and it is the same with the sickness benefit and the parental leave benefits ... **you** must have lost an income in order to be entitled to compensate for it and even if there are some minimum level as for parental leave for instance ... there are very low ... and it is the same with unemployment benefits here ... there is also a minimum level but **you** must prove that **you** have been working in order to be entitled.”

There hence seems to be tension between the logics of fairness and that of equality, not least as the logics of fairness is based on the assumption that people are not equal.

“The Swedish welfare system is essentially residency based ... it is not only a minimum level ... it is no flat rate system ... We have had another ambition in Sweden ... we have another minima level ... (we have) even labour related benefits ... connected to the income you have got ...”

By underpinning that the system tries to be just and tries to “repair” injustice and inequality – in the sense that some people are richer than other – the expert in this extract is keen to pinpoint that the system is not only a flat rate system. Here the principle of equal treatment is at play in relation to fairness, taking peoples’ contributions and conditions in account. Hence, the logics of fairness states that it would be unfair to treat people equal and to allocate the same social benefits to everyone, since it would disadvantage contributors and thus discourage people to contribute to the system (pay taxes). The logic of fairness thus challenges the principle of equal treatment and thereby the logic of equality. This focus on fairness in the experts’ narratives might also be a roundabout way to remind that social benefits causes high financial cost to the state and to legitimize some social “injustice” in the system between contributing and none-contributing welfare claimants.

The narratives picture a tacit moral contract between the state and its citizens. This contract is based on an idea of trust, where protection and fairness becomes inseparable from control. Citizens should put their trust in the system. They should trust the system to act in a fair way and for their best. The other way around, the system should trust its citizens. As one expert pinpointed while speaking about taxes declaration, the standpoint is that most of the citizens are trustful, serious, honest people, which can be seen in the following quotation:

“... and what people are saying “we would like to fill in correctly but it is so difficult, we don’t understand the forms, we don’t understand the regulations”. So, we have been working now for ten years in order to make all booklet (instruction) easier to read and forms easier to fill up ...”

The tacit moral contract between the state and its citizen implies also that any limitation on welfare has to be legitimate.

“We have also built up a system in which many people feel that “have you been contributing, so you should also be entitled”. And all infringement to entitlement must be legitimate.”

In the administrative guidelines issued by the Swedish government, the principle of fairness is meant to govern civil servant’s discretionary decisions on who are to be registered in the population register or with the social security agency. The task of creating fairness in these decisions has been quite difficult, which is illustrated by the fact that the eighth’s version of a guideline has now been published:

“What has been the most difficult and that begins to be clearer, is who can be seen as being able to enjoy his/her right of residence, to benefit from free movement? We have thus with the help of our legal department published our position, which is now in its eighth version which reveals somehow, that it wasn’t so easy to know, when we should say “Yes, you can be register here in Sweden” or when we have to say “No, we don’t consider that you should be register in Sweden”. And people who have been refused registration, have the possibility to turn to the Migrations board and apply for residence, so it is not that they are not allowed to stay in the country. There might be other way for them to stay.”

The expert underlines the good will of the Taxes Office’s towards EU mobile citizen by emphasizing that all decisions are carefully motivated in order to avoid any unfairness and by

mentioning that all applicants turned down by the tax agency can take their case further. Her suggestion is to turn for instance to the migration board. This is however somewhat awkward, as this board has not been dealing with EU intra migration since 2014. The principle of fairness, stipulated in the guidelines is nevertheless not always easy to implement, since “each family coming has somehow its own background, everything has to be taken into consideration in the decision we are doing ...”. The expert in this quotation puts to the fore that the system aims to treat everyone equally (logics of equality), but also has to take into account the individuals’ situation (logic of fairness) and hence illustrates the tension between the two logics.

As social tourism would be very unjust to those people who are really qualifying for benefits according to the logics of fairness, the interviewees also seem to be in constant dialogue with the public debate on this. “No, no ... there is no fear regarding social tourism or so ...” The debate of social tourism was presented as an unjustified fear in Sweden. Nevertheless, welfare tourism eventually being there anyway was a propositional assumption shadowing the interviews. As we will see in next section this assumption was also used to legitimize control.

“If one would listen to the debate going on, one should believe that Sweden is a country everyone migrate to ... in order to abuse our system. In the future, we will have to face a huge migration out of Sweden”.

Simultaneously as the interviewees down play the risks of social tourism and of abuse of the Swedish system, there are obviously regulations set to hinder such practices. As pensioners are the costliest group in the society regarding health care, EU mobile pensioners might for example be included in Swedish population register only if they are entitled to health insurance either through their country of origin (or the country they get their pension from), or through a comprehensive private health insurance. The threat of social tourism, and thus of unfairness, might also lie behind the decision that only EU mobile jobseekers who completed their last employment period in Sweden might be eligible to accumulation (not everyone can enter in the system). Otherwise all EU jobseekers (insured previously in another EU country) could move to Sweden, require accumulation and get an unemployment benefit calculated at the Swedish rate.

“... you can get benefit based SOLELY on ... that you have ... worked or ... in some way contributed ... in another country ... and then you come here ... and say “yes, but in Poland or in Spain ... or in Germany so ... I have done that and that”, and then we have to look at it as if it had been conducted in Sweden ... BUT in the unemployment insurance regulation there is an article concerning coordination which stipulates that AT LEAST ONE DAY ... YES, SWEDEN has interpreted it as ONE DAY but it is written A PERIOD ... so ONE PERIOD conducted in the country ... or within the system in which you want to apply and get your benefit ... According to the regulation it is the LAST day of work that have to have been conducted in Sweden.”

The rather heated Swedish debate about posted workers and so called social dumping can also be viewed in relation to the logic of fairness. This debate is based on the propositional assumption that East European workers – due to posting – can offer their work at lower salaries than Swedish labour. This is challenging the Swedish Solidarity wage policy and thereby also challenging both the aim of equal pay for equal jobs and the central job evaluation to determine “fair” wage differentials. The posting of workers hence challenges central features in the Swedish labour market model (Lapidus 2015). By selling themselves to a salary lower than the Swedish trade union agreed, posted workers are in the Swedish debate interpreted as not showing solidarity towards other workers according to the Swedish labour market model and thus treating the Swedish workers unfairly.

By agreeing to conditions that minimize their social rights the posted workers also challenge the Swedish collective bargaining agreements. This is another central feature in the Swedish labour market model that is aimed to guarantee that the same rules will apply to everyone and that establishes the minimum acceptable terms of employment in a sector. Here posted workers are seen as the ones who are *themselves* treated unfair, rather than the ones treating their fellow worker unfair. This as they should have the same social rights as others according to the logic of fairness. The posted workers are hence in the first instance perceived of as perpetrators treating the Swedish workers unfair and in the second instance as victims who are themselves treated unfair. By not competing on equal grounds, and thereby regarded as unfair, they however in both instances challenge the logics of fairness.

To round of this section, we can conclude that the logic of fairness is built on assumptions that people are not equal. Rather only those who are contributing shall be entitled to earning-related welfare. Thus, the logic of fairness contains class (employment) and nationality

(national, European) as categories of belonging. But class has to be connected to contribution to the welfare system, which exclude illegal workers, posted workers and unemployed people (who haven't opened up their right through some hour's employment in the country in which they are claiming benefits). As will be shown below the logic of fairness is also closely related to control, as it is built on value assumptions that control is a way of creating fairness.

A logic of autonomy – class intersecting with gender

Even though the Swedish system is depicted as very generous and protecting, it is grounded on the value assumption that individuals should not be depending on it except in natural basic need situations, but rather take care of themselves. One could hence talk of a Swedish logic of autonomy.

Simultaneously as the logic of autonomy is grounded on the value assumption that individuals should not be dependent on the state, it also prescribes state subsidies to hinder individual's dependency of other individuals. Autonomy is a strong cultural ideal prevailing the Swedish society (Runfors 2006a, 2006b) and the logic of autonomy can actually be seen as underpinning the whole Swedish welfare systems grounding on individuals. The logic of autonomy is based on the propositional assumption that people residing in Sweden should be insured in the system on an individual basis, and not through another person, as they should not be dependent on others. This aspect of the Swedish system is not seldom explained by contrasting it to other welfare systems where rights are linked to a breadwinner, which make individuals depending on other individuals and also tends to in practice put gender into play.

"One is individually insured in Sweden ... you don't get insured through your husband or wife ... it is you who are insured /.../ it is different in ... how legislation is set up in ... in countries ... where you have a breadwinner."

The Swedish system for example gives support to individuals so that they do not have to be dependent of their relatives and furthermore support women to prevent dependency on men.

"This benefit is not meant for the children as much as for the mother and the father to make them till equal care..."

Here we again can see how the logic of autonomy operates together with the logic of equality in order to counteract gender inequality.

The logic of autonomy is furthermore one of the logics behind the PIN, since inclusion and thereby belonging depends not only on residency, but also on the possibility of the EU mobile citizens to take care of themselves, to be non-dependent on the state. As stated by the Swedish Taxes Board, in order to be registered in the system EU mobile citizens not only need to prove staying at least one year in Sweden, *but also* to be able to show that they can make use of this right of residence by supporting themselves and by having a sufficiently health insurance.

“You should also be able to prove that you can make use of your right of residence, and that means that one should have a job or have sufficient money, that one has a health insurance or that sorts of things that prove that one is able to care for oneself. And it is just this sort of estimation.”

A clear relation of equivalence is drawn here between right of residency, employment, self-sufficiency and health insurance. The logic of autonomy is hence connected to a strong ethic of work and of supporting oneself, just as is the logic of fairness. Actually, both the national welfare system and the EU one essentially sustains workers and potential workers. The equivalence between entitlement and work was especially obvious regarding entitlement to unemployment benefits.

“However, unemployment benefits are relatively labour based. You need to have been working in order to be entitled ... it is not enough ... to be unemployed and been looking for job. YOU need to show that you have been working before ... and here comes in the issue of loss of income ... and it is the same with the sickness benefit and the parental leave benefits ... you must have lost an income in order to be able to compensate for it and even if there are some minimum level as for parental leave for instance ... there are very low ... and it is the same with unemployment benefits here ... there is also a minimum level but you must prove that you have been working in order to be entitled.”

The logic of autonomy and the following principle of taking care for oneself furthermore underpins the restrictions of unemployed EU mobile citizens. If an EU citizen is a jobseeker in Sweden (and haven't worked in Sweden the period before getting unemployed), s/he won't

be able to get a PIN since s/he, according to EU regulations, is only allowed to reside six months abroad as unemployed. The tax office in Sweden will hence not register the migrant and provide her/him with a PIN – since s/he cannot plan to stay in the country for more than one year. Thus, unemployed EU citizens might stay in Sweden only if they are receiving unemployment benefit from their former country of work (through U2), but cannot belong to the Swedish welfare system and are not eligible to a PIN.

To sum up, it seems that the logic of autonomy is one of several logics that governs which EU mobile citizens will be able to get registered in the Swedish system – for example will be given a PIN and thus regarded as belonging. The migrants seen as belonging are EU mobile citizens who have been and are insured in their country of origin or who are going to be insured in Sweden through employment, might belong to the Swedish welfare system: the ones with at least one-year employment contract (or the promise of one-year employment) who will be insured in Sweden through their work, self-employed people with a comprehensive sickness insurance, insured EU mobile citizens who can prove that they are financially self-sufficient and have a comprehensive sickness insurance and pensioners with health insurance from their home country or with sufficient private social insurance.

A control effect

As we have seen, the Swedish discourse of belonging consists of several logics, which all intersect with each other. We have identified a logic of space and time related welfare, a logic of equality, a logic of fairness and a logic of autonomy. These could all be interpreted as social logics, which is logics that are naturalized and taken for granted. As will be discussed later on this interpretation can partly also be questioned though.

As we have also seen, there is a conflict in between the social logic of equality, the one of fairness and that of autonomy. While the social logic of equality works towards sameness, equal treatment and welfare *unrelated* to contribution, the social logics of fairness and autonomy foster control with the aim to secure welfare in line with contribution rather than equal treatment.

Hence, control was constantly advocated as a mean to ensure fairness and sustain the Swedish welfare system, notably by carefully supporting the willingness of all residents to contribute and pay taxes. Thus, the other side of the fairness-coin is control and one could say that the logic of fairness – together with the logics of equality – fosters a system that is both omnipotent and monitoring. There are for example very strong monitoring links between the Tax Board population register and the welfare system. The Tax Board authorities do not only register migrants, but also determine – and thereby control – who is to be included in the country, as expressed by one Tax Board expert: “We are the ones who acknowledge who is in the country.”

Furthermore, the linking together of all agencies concerned with Swedish social security ensures an ability to control all registered inhabitants. Even when migrants do not register with the Social security agency, the agency might get an impulse from another administration to launch the procedure of registration. By an effect of domino, contacts with one administration will open up for control by all the other administrations.

“(W)hen working parents come to Sweden they have to register themselves at the Swedish social security agency and in the form to be filled up there are some lines regarding children. And there are also lines to be filled if the child is living in Sweden or not. So, it is on the basis of this form that we got an impulse then. And does the child live in Sweden so we get an impulse about immigration from the Taxes Board Office. So, we have to know that they have children, they have to declare it in the forms.”

In the narrations, this linking together of all agencies is however depicted as efficiency and the differences between contact and control are blurred. Control appears as something positive, as a way of reaching out to everybody. In the name of fairness nobody should be forgotten and control is thus depicted as having a fair and protective aim.

Further, as the Swedish experts underlined several times, one of the challenges in the Swedish social system is to maintain the citizens’ motivation to pay their social taxes. This propositional assumption relies on the idea that if the same benefits were allocated to everyone despite contribution this would undermine the wish to work and pay taxes. It is therefore important to keep down any suspicion on people exploiting the social system and to assure the

contributors that they are providing to a secure and *fair* system. Hence, by highlighting the possibility of abusing the welfare system, experts justify control.

“Benefits shouldn’t go to people who haven’t been in the system and contributed /---/ the willingness to contribute is very important to sustain. If you begin to give benefit to people who haven’t contributed in general ... you will sap the contribution’s willingness of all the others ... If you see that “this person has never been working and get unemployment benefit ... why should I pay and contribute to this person?” It is very important to suppress such thoughts and therefore is it also so important with control in our system ...”

The expert puts forward her argument by creating a relation of equivalence between on the one hand contribution and willingness to sustain the system and on the other hand no contribution with the causal effect of sapping the system. In other word, in order to sustain the system, fairness must be addressed from the point of view of the contributors. The idea of control stands out as being for the individual’s best, as anyone taking advantage of the system would create unfairness against the people who have contributed to the system and put their trust in it. The welfare system appears as a good and protective parent who knows best what is good for its flock and protects it against risks they might encounter. Even the risk of contributing without being able to take advantages of the contribution has been taken into account – as a threshold has been established in order to protect contributors.

“(W)e have also the rule which says that you have to ... we pay out unemployment benefit until you turn 65 and the reason is that if you are unemployed and 65 years old, you should retire. At that point you shouldn’t live on unemployment benefit but rather you should retire ... and pension is often lower than unemployment benefit (...) so it is a sort of safety valve for the system ... and therefore there has been introduced a rule stipulating that you cannot contribute to an unemployment insurance fund if you are 64 years old since ... you cannot fulfil the 12 months condition ... so it was a sort security rule one could say ... these good people who want to contribute to an unemployment insurance fund, but who will never get the possibility to get any benefit, they shouldn’t pay 300kr per month (...) So we have a rule that function very well for national purpose but for a person who has been mobile within the labour market and come back to Sweden after having reached 64 years and who is unemployed and would like to get unemployment benefits ... they can only fulfil the conditions to get ... the unemployment allowance, the minimum sum ... they aren’t eligible to earnings-related ... and that is a sort of ...”

But if the point was to protect citizen against a possible abuse of the system itself, it was established on a national basis and didn’t take into account the EU dimension, as pinpointed

in the quotation. One expert pointed out, that even if equal and fair treatment *should* govern the welfare administration, this is not always the case – this since the principle for determining on which basis equal treatment and fairness should be grounded is not always clear. The same expert also at several times points out that even if the principle of equal treatment should guide their decisions, there is a certain interpretative space in the regulations, which might act in favour to nation-states.

“(I)s it motivated through a political labour market perspective to give a person who might not stay in Sweden the possibility to take a program? ... yeah ... that’s the question ... We find some court judgement that gave us some guidelines ... and from them ... we could conclude in our intern investigation that “it is in fact ok to ... one can as an individual state within the EU, in some extent discriminate employees from other countries ... yeah ... so you might test them “do you have a connection or not to the Swedish labour market?” ... and if you have one we are really not allowed to discriminate ... but if you don’t have ... if you can’t prove that ... that you have in a way or another a connection here ... we don’t have to provide you with any support And then there is a third question: Are political labour market activities to be considered as social economic benefits? It is difficult ... and it is still a difficult question. We have not decided yet how we should address this group.”

The expert above motivates some degree of unequal treatment of EU mobile citizen by relying on the uncommunicated acceptance within the EU for a member state to discriminate in some extent citizen from another country. This is achieved by taking advantages of the inconsistency within the EU coordination regulations in order to justify discrimination of some individuals. Hence, tests such as habitual residency test (intention to settle for at least one year) or ‘genuine and effective perspective of work’ test might be seen as ways for negotiating EU mobile citizens’ access (or rather lack of it) to social security benefits and as an indirect way of controlling who would be included in the Swedish welfare system. Further, this indicates that equal treatment is geared towards Swedish citizens rather than EU-movers.

The idea of control in intersection with the logic of fairness, fuelled by the perception that EU mobile citizens sometimes “just pop up” and thereby threaten the well-functioning and neat Swedish system, may explain the constant complaints about the (lack of) coordination of social security procedure within the EU. The lack of coordination of social security procedures within the EU is depicted as not giving secure control over the job willingness and the contributions of EU movers. This may thus risk to challenge the Swedish logic of fairness.

“And how can we control that a person who has settled in another country is looking for job? ... Somehow you don't have any more ... for sure ...you can send letters and so and ask them to send their cover letters. But it is already difficult to control people who are looking for job HERE and now we should control that people are looking for job THERE as well ...”

The value assumption on the lack of control seems also to be central in the interviewees' complaints about the slowness of the EU procedures and the absence of electronic exchange between the different administrations in Europe.

“All this administrative work became very time consuming. And there are many who don't answer, so it is what it is all about, it became very slow, and we send reminder and we try to keep up with answering so it takes a lot of time. And it goes very slowly”.

The advantages with harmonization of the different administrative documents and procedure within the EU (birth certificates, wedding certificate and so on) is likewise mentioned by experts as a way of facilitating the administrative life of EU mobile citizen. The idea that the harmonization of administrative documents might be a roundabout way to control EU citizens' income and movement, and thereby to secure fairness, is however not clearly expressed by the experts.

One of our results are that the idea of control communicates that there is a tacit moral contract between the state and its citizens which is built on a relation of equivalence between on the one hand contribution and willingness to sustain the system and on the other hand no contribution with the causal effect of sapping the system. This logic is not only built on assumptions that control is performed for the individual's protection, but also on tacit assumptions that control protects the social order and the organisation of the welfare system. It generates a welfare system that is both omnipotent and controlling. The mentioning of social tourism can be understood as a way to legitimize that the system has to control so that non-contributing do not slip into the Swedish social security system and take advantages of it.

The logic of Europeanness – nationality as a category of belonging

Another conclusion is that characterizing logics of the Swedish discourse of belonging – logics of equality, fairness and autonomy – are being challenged by the logic of Europeanness. EU-mobility was, in a general sense, depicted as something positive by the Swedish experts. This was the case notably when value assumptions concerning people who came to work and people who went away to work, were taken up.

“When looking on EU migration, the focus is directed to ... what is called the vulnerable EU migrants ... huh ... and not to the labour migration that is positive and that we WANT to have and that we WANT to support ... And it is ALSO only focus on people ... on migration TO Sweden and very little focus on migration FROM Sweden.”

But as we have seen the free EU-migration was also seen as causing problems, and challenging deeply embedded logics on what's equal and fair.

“(T)he EU system makes it possible for people who have not contributed to the Swedish system, to be eligible to Swedish social benefits. It might generate some situation when people who have been working in another country – in which taxes might be lower and in which the social protection might be lower – might enter the Swedish social system.”

According to one expert, the EU relies on the propositional assumption of “a free market to everyone, from everywhere.” The discourse of free movement advocated by the EU is clearly in tension with the logics of space and time related welfare and the protection based on the nation-state. Hence, EU directives challenges *both* the logic of fairness and the logic of space and time related welfare.

The logic of equality intersects with the logic of space and time related welfare in the sense that the logic of equality is most prominent regarding Swedish citizen and people included by being in possession of a PIN – that is, people seen to belong according to the logic of space and time related welfare. This means that the logic of Europeanness challenges the logic of equality, even though the interviewees underline the awareness that EU movers *should* be equally treated. The EU regulations are based on the propositional assumptions that labour done in another country should be recognized in Sweden and open eligibility into the Swedish

social system. The fairness principle embedded in the EU coordination regulation for example motivates the fact that EU mobile citizen shouldn't lose any benefits because of their mobility.

"We try to adapt to the article 59 so that there won't be any gap in entitlement, for instance from the country you have been entitled hitherto to the country which is responsible for this month. So, it is as If you had been entitled in Poland for instance for November and then all the family has been moving here from the first day of the month, and was entitled in the other country, they shouldn't consequently be any gap so we have to continue paying. Even if, according to our national legislation, you might be entitled only the month after your application. But there comes the regulation in ... Since one shouldn't be without benefit one month."

As mentioned, discrepancies between EU and the Swedish system often come out when interviewees mention difference before and after Sweden's accession to the EU (1995). When answering to a question related to the Swedish welfare system, one expert for instance put forward that the Swedish welfare system, although "solid" and "generous", hasn't managed entirely to adapt to the new world represented by EU. The argument relies on the propositional assumption that everything is well functioning and fair as long as you are in the system. But as the world has been changing lately, outsiders to the system encounter problems to integrate in it. There are throughout the interviews value assumptions put to the fore that Sweden is doing its best in order to harmonize its regulation with the EU ones and to be fair.

"And it is just this sort of estimation 'What is a comprehensive health insurance? What is sufficient money?' And it is exactly what is in the eighth version here, so we began to feel more and more secure. It has also happened that we had in some case to say no. We refused and the person lodged an appeal. And it ended up at the court and was reheard. We got some guidance through the court verdict and got answer if we thought right or if we thought wrong."

Here again we see a sort of discrepancy between different levels, the national and EU. According to the experts the national welfare system has to adapt to EU and to follow the EU regulations. It is interesting here to see that the national level is active in the harmonization process but passivated in the sense that the EU and its court has the last word.

To conclude, we argue that the logic of Europeanness has the role of a political logic in relation to the various social logics that are characterizing the Swedish discourse in the Swedish discourse as it contests the logics of equality, fairness and autonomy. The logic of Europeanness also intersect with the logic of fairness by trying to extend and legitimize the discourse of control to the entire EU space.

One question is whether the strong underlining of the logic of equality in the interviews could be seen as an effect of it being challenged by the EU logic of Europeanness. If so, the strong underlining of the logic of equality can be interpreted as a sign that it is beginning to change *from* being a social logic – where the ideal of equality is naturalised – *to* be a fantasmatic logic. Because equality also seems to be an ideal the experts cling to because they are so invested in it, even though practice does not lend itself to it.

Inclusion and exclusion in the Swedish discourse of belonging

One more interesting finding concerns how EU citizens coming to Sweden in general were talked of and the question of who was regarded as a migrant or not. It turned out that EU members coming to work in Sweden for shorter or longer periods where sometimes, but rather seldom, associated with the concept of migrant.⁹ In general, the concept of migrant was associated with the most common category of movers to Sweden nowadays, refugees – that is, people needing protection of some sort. Occasionally, it was also associated with the 1960ies dominating type of migrants to Sweden that is labour migrants who came to Sweden to work and who not seldom planned to return once they had become wealthier, but who often ended up staying – at least until pension. One could actually interpret the narratives as not really seeing working – and in other means self-supporting – EU mobile citizens as “real migrants” and as automatically included.

“EU migration ended up very much in the shadow of the migration to EU from the third world ... yeah ... in this context, EU migration ... is a trivial issue ... we are speaking about some thousand people ... while people from

⁹ All interviewees mention that migration is not only an issue about immigration but also about emigration and that many “native” Swede work abroad and especially young Swedish citizen are moving within the EU. When discussing these transnational aspects of welfare, the issue of migration is voiced as something positive.

the third world ... it is several *ten* thousand people ... maybe over hundreds of thousands in one or one and a half year ... And one issue of interest in this context is ... namely the indirect discrimination of EU citizen ... since, ... yeah, within the setting-up aid for newcomers migrant ... we provide them a fantastic catalogue with rights ... they got housing, they got access to a special political labour market program, they got subsidies ... they got of course without saying a setting-up allowance ... BUT for EU citizen it is still like “yeah, you have to prove a connection, and we can reduce contributions and ...” . And principally I don’t see any difference between a Syrian person coming here and a Spanish person who comes here and look for job ... it should be the same thing ... I would say.”

In other words, EU citizens need to be active – and for instance register at different agencies, get a PIN, contact SOLVIT, take their case to court etc. – in order to actually be included. This while refugees might be passive as they are seen as in need of protection and are taken care of by the system. This is a way to understand that it seems to be non-problematized that EU members in practice have to be performative agents in order to get their social rights. This, in turn, privileges well educated EU mobile citizens with vast social and cultural capital. The extension of the logic of equality to EU mobile citizen hence blurs the distinction between Swedish and European citizen and masks the difficulties that can arouse when moving to a new welfare system.

According to the Swedish discourse of belonging *the desirable EU movers* seems to be those who do work, who can take care of themselves and who do contribute to the system. As mentioned, this has some unintended consequences. EU citizens are for example not seen as in need of the same support as for example refugees – which are granted settings-up aids.

The undesired EU migrants in turn are those who cannot support themselves. Also posted workers are depicted as undesired migrants by the experts interviewed. They are seen as people in a desperate situation, which might accept social dumping of wages etc. This in turn challenges the logic of fairness by treating others unfair and by also accepting to be treated unfairly.

So, which *criteria of inclusion and exclusion* can be identified in the Swedish discourse of belonging? As the Swedish experts concentrated on explaining the regulations and translating them into mundane spoken language, their articulations was to a high extent very close to the

welfare regulations. Hence, the experts' interviewees corroborated that the first criteria for belonging is related to status of employment. Besides being employed, EU-movers also need to be self-supporting and contributing to the Swedish system by paying taxes. These conditions are related to the logic of space and time restricted welfare as well as the logic of autonomy, in intersection with the logic of fairness (welfare to those who contribute). Here we can thus identify *class* in the sense of employment status as a criterion of inclusion and exclusion. Yet, as the experts put to the fore, the EU citizen must be able also to present a working contract of at least one year or the promise to get such in order to belong. This indicates that *time* and *space* related criteria for belonging are also present (at least one year in the national space of Sweden). Accordingly, we can argue that immobility (settled way of life) along with *nationality* are determinant factor for belonging. Indeed, *nationality* (in terms of a political membership) though being disguised, is in practice a fundamental category of belonging since only Swedish or EU citizen would be included in the Swedish discourse of belonging.

The above means that those who are seen as belonging to the welfare state are first and foremost Swedish citizens residing in the country (or contributing to the Swedish welfare system), but also insured EU citizen with a state or private comprehensive sickness insurance, self-sufficient EU mobile citizen who are rich enough to afford a private health insurance. Other EU mobile citizen belonging are, self-employed EU citizen, EU citizen of independent means, pensioners and students with more than one year courses. All expert interviewees put to the fore in their narratives, that EU mobile citizens belong if they are insured (in another EU country) or if they will be insured in Sweden through their work (under at least one year). The criterion of class seems very important since it entitled EU migrant with short time work contract to health insurance (if holders of a specific document) even though they are excluded on the basis of the space and time criteria (see p. 40).

Those who are excluded are subsequently EU mobile citizen without comprehensive sickness insurance, EU mobile citizen who don't belong to a social security system, none self-sufficient EU citizen and pensioners from another country who would like to stay in Sweden long term. Again, one could say that *class* in the sense of status of employment and wealth plays a role for belongingness. But *age* is also one factor since this logic and the rules connected with it

restrain the mobility of retired people within the EU. As pensioners are the most expensive group in a society, due to the health problems that comes with age, the Swedish state might be reluctant to foreign pensioners who never contributed in the Swedish social security system. As for the pensioners who contributed to the Swedish Social security system and who decide to settle abroad, they have to be healthy, and need to return to Sweden if they get sick.

As came out from the experts' narratives, the discourse of belonging and its criteria of inclusion and exclusion has significant effect on job seeking EU-citizens – who according to EU regulation, are allowed to reside up to six months abroad as unemployed – but who won't be registered in the Swedish welfare system and treated as belonging as they cannot plan to stay (and care for themselves) for more than one year. The only non-insured EU-movers that might be seen as belonging are people of independent means such as wealthy EU-citizens or pensioned EU-citizens who are able to afford the private comprehensive insurance with a ten million ceiling. So, EU mobile citizens only belongs if they are insured (in another EU country) or if they will be insured in Sweden through their work (under one year).

Accordingly, the desired migrants are the one who have the ability to work (working age and healthy) and who are self-supporting, which exclude people over 65, disabled people and none self-supporting EU citizen (for instance Roma migrants).

The gender criteria might be mentioned as well, in the sense that the system can only register females or males, not a third gender but this criteria had no relevance for belongingness.

4. COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION

This chapter summarizes and compares the two national views on EU-migration displayed above. What are the similarities and the differences, for example regarding the logics underpinning the two discourses of belonging and the criteria of inclusions and exclusion they produce?

Even though the Swedish experts were interviewed with the same interview guideline as the Estonian experts, the outcomes of the two interviews sets were very different. Whereas the Estonian experts hardly ever referred to specific welfare regulations, the Swedish experts mainly focused on the regulations and concentrated on explaining their often complicated and intertwined character – thereby clarifying how migrants are being received in Sweden and why they are met the way they are. Their constant attempt to translate the administrative and juridical documents into mundane spoken language, made their articulation very close to the welfare regulations. As mentioned in the introduction this can partly be understood as an effect of the researcher interviewing the Swedish experts being a non-national and therefore perceived as an outsider. But it can also be seen as an effect of the mobility-receiving country perspective that was voiced by the Swedish experts – in contrast to the mobility-sending country perspective of the Estonian experts.

The most significant difference between the narratives of the Estonian experts and the Swedish ones are the perspectives from which they talk about EU-migration, mobility and welfare. The Estonian experts were to a large extent during the interviews concerned with Estonia's outwards migration and Estonia's outward relationships – such as the relationships between Estonia and countries that are receiving Estonian mobile citizens. They gave voice to a sending country perspective in the form of a discourse of subordination as they narrated an understanding of power-dynamics inside EU – power-dynamics where Western states are presented as making the rules, whereas Eastern European states are seen as being forced to oblige these rules. But there was a clear intertextuality and dialogicity in the narratives as they also talked back to derogatory images of Eastern Europe and gave voice to as a 'hitting from below' and claiming recognition perspective. This was done among other things by branding the Estonian welfare system as very efficient and up to date and by describing Estonia as an EU-adaptive model case. Above all it was done by claiming that the above features should render Estonia a position as belonging to West.

The Swedish expert in contrast talked from a power position that is taken for granted. They were talking from receiving country perspective, being occupied with the Swedish handling of the inflow of EU mobile citizens. They seemed much identified with the regulations and stand out as the prolonged arm of the system. If there ever were any critique posed towards the

system, it concerned instances when the regulations had unintended consequences or when there was space for discretionary judgements. The main critique was directed towards the complicated and non-transparent character of the system and against the PIN-system. In contrast to the Estonian experts, the Swedish ones do not cast Sweden as a country that is very obeying to EU. Rather Sweden is described as trying to adjust, although having a system that does not always fit together with the EU directives. Nevertheless the system is view as excellent.

The different power relations described above result in different discourses of belonging. The dominating part of Estonian discourse of belonging is directed outwards – focusing on where Estonia as a state should belong. Another, less dominating part, is directed inwards – focusing on who should belong to Estonia's welfare system. In the Swedish case, the inwards directed discourse of belonging on who should belong to the Swedish welfare system dominates, while the outwards directed part is downplayed. Nevertheless, when the position of Sweden within EU is taken up, it is always expressed from a power centre perspective, which generates a discourse of superiority.

The Estonian *outbound* discourse of belonging is underpinned by a logic of East and West proved by the Estonian expert discourse of subordination and their positioning of Estonia in the power periphery. It is also underpinned by a logic of westernisation, which is a fantasmatic logic expressing desires to be part of Western Europe.

The *inbound* Estonian discourse of belonging is in turn underpinned by a logic of the nation, a logic of non-dependency of state as well as a logic of the citizens as in debt to the state. The logic of the nation communicates that those who belong are foremost national Estonians – something that is *not* in line with the regulations who also embrace non-national Estonians. The logic of non-dependency of state in turn transmits that allowed to belong are those who are likely to be autonomous in relation to the welfare state. Finally, the logic of the citizens as in debt to the state communicates that it is the citizen's duty to not burden the state. This means that you should migrate if you cannot support yourself in Estonia respectively return to Estonia if you have migrated and are a high skilled person with competencies needed in the Estonian labour market. While the logic of the nation is a social logic, a naturalised logic, the

ones of non-dependency and of the citizens as in debt to the state in turn stand out as logics who have been political but are now developing into social logics, that is logics that have been under question but that are increasingly becoming more and more self-evident.

The Swedish discourse of belonging, for its part, is governed by a variety of intersecting logics which sometimes challenge each other – creating a more complicated and contradictory discourse of belonging. These are the logic of the national, the logic of equality, the logic of fairness and the logic of non-dependency to the state. The logic of the nation is the basic logic and communicates that those who decide for the national space in terms of staying at least one year do belong. The logic of equality in turn states that all belonging according to the logic of the nation should be treated equal, while the logic of fairness somewhat challenges this and states that those who contribute to the system are those who belong. The logic of non-dependency of the state finally communicates that you should try to be non-dependent of the state. These logics can all be seen as social logics, as they are naturalized and taken for granted. The logic of equality however has a fantasmatic aspect to it, as the experts cling to it even if it is more and more challenged today.

These countries' logics and the discourses they create also produce different criteria of inclusion and exclusion for the two nations. In the Estonian case, nationality intersects with class as criteria's of inclusion and exclusion. This intersection generates a very narrow sample of desirable immigrants: highly skilled ethnic Estonian or returning migrants who correspond to need of the national labour market. In the Swedish case the logics at play shape the criteria of inclusion and exclusion which are mainly related to time, space and class. This creates a wider sample of desired migrants, for instance those who are staying for one year or more, that are being employed, self-supporting and/or contributing to the Swedish system by paying taxes are viewed as belonging.

As we have seen the logic on the national and the logic of non-dependency on the state appear in both country cases however. Yet, there are divergences in the interpretation of these seemingly similar logics. If we start with the logic of the national it is in the Estonian case related to ethnicity as a criterion of inclusion, while it in the Swedish case is based on the criterions of time and space. The logic of non-dependence in turn is in the Estonian case

related to assumptions on citizens being in debt to the state, while the Swedish logic of non-dependence rather assumes the state as in debt to the citizens, in the sense of being responsible for making them independent in case they cannot manage by themselves. In other words, in the Estonian discourse the citizens seem to be there to serve the state, while the state on the contrary is seen as there to serve the citizens in the Swedish case.

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